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Transformation Through Training Issue No 7 July 2015 37 populace. Nowadays this course of action is assessed as a high threat level and it is characterized by a problematic unpredictability which undermines morale and cohesion among unarmed populace international and indigenous security forces. An IT perpetrator is guided by a variety of complex motivations but basically attackers can be categorized as insurgent manipulated personally motivated criminally motivated and for an unknown reason. Whatever the reason caused an insider threat attack insurgents will always claim it and try to use it in their favor. Usually there is no specific concept for an IT attack and that is why they are characterized by full surprise and shock. The latest statistics show that the percentage of fatalities caused by this type of action shows an increasing trend. However the most important remark in this case is again the message sent out by insurgents as the political capital and impact gained is much bigger. Conclusion As mentioned in the previous section an insurgency is a persistent ubiquitous small dirty and uncomfortable war48 that in case of Iraq and Afghanistan reflects the will of a national religious group to resort to the use of force in order to achieve political objectives without necessarily making rational estimations about the expected results. Moreover it was also stated that the modern rebel movements are basically ethnically or religiously motivated since the traditional ideological source of their inspiration Marxism and communism have declined and are no longer valid. The aforementioned fact in combination with the current social and economic discontent acts in favor of low-intention conflicts thus the phenomenon of insurgency is expected to be continued in the immediate future. To recapitulate learning and adopting is a never ending procedure that applies in every aspect of human activity. It also offers a variety of practical lessons as well as some specific recommendations in terms of policy and military doctrine. Despite the differences between the two insurgencies there are several cases where common ground can be detected and therefore courses of action already tested with success can be applied.49 Consequently COIN requires a similar approach and therefore we must ensure that all best practices and LL are equally shared and adopted by friendly forces and organizations. Todays types of insurgency differ from those of the past mainly in terms of motivation and objectives to be achieved. It is important to understand that the principles and the means of this complex subset of warfare remain unaltered through ages and therefore experiences and lessons gained from the past could be re-examined and appropriately tailored to the needs of the contemporary theater of operation. After all what works today may not work tomorrow and what works in one location may not work in another.50 Bibliography Betz D. 2007 Redesigning Land Forces for Wars amongst the People Contemporary Security Policy 282 221-243 Boot M. 2013 Invisible Armies An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present Liveright Publishing Corporation N.Y. 10110 Cordesman A.H. 2006 The Iraq War and Lessons for Counterinsurgency Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Draft Revised March 16 2006 Corum J.S. 2006 Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency A Tale of Two Insurgencies U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute FM 3-24 2006 Counterinsurgency HQ Department of the US Army Washington DC 15 December 2006 FM 3-24.2 2009 Tactics in Counterinsurgency HQ Department of the US Army Washington DC 21 April 2009 Fishel J.T. 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