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36 Transformation Through Training Issue No 7 July 2015 On the other hand it should be noted that the technology is not available in most of the countries facing insurgency. Physical superiority of conventional forces against the insurgents is obvious but the analysis that preceded shows that a lot depends on willingness of conventional forces to use its superior power and adjust their structure so as to fight wars amongst people.36 In this context the growing international sensitivity for human rights can prevent conventional forces from using the most effective methods to combat the insurgents. Besides the international interest in human rights is manifested most often selectively and in any case where a rebel movement transformed from mere annoyance to a threat to the established order then the state forces act and ignore international public opinion. Consequently the effectiveness of insurgents seems not to differ from that they had in the past. But which will become apparent generalizations have no place in an insurgency conflict. This conclusion explains why while conducting a COIN campaign one should avoid utilizing purely conventional tactics and viewing the population merely as on lookers or irrelevant at best local tactical victories against an ever replenishing insurgency can be gained in the short term but ultimately a major disaster may ensue. On the other hand indigenous political leaders police and military forces need to be trained and brought onside on the broadest possible basis. The population must be actively engaged and the weight of the campaign must be transferred over the local forces. Finally success will be established only by diminishing the active support basis for the insurgency by marginalizing it within the society and associating the new government with a distinct improvement of the general living conditions of the population as opposed to those still supporting the anti-government forces. This is a quote from David Galulas classic work Counterinsurgency Warfare published in 1964 A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgents forcesA victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.37 Future dynamics in COIN Experience gained in theater indicates that COIN operations nowadays and in close future will be dominated by three new dynamics as analyzed below. Shortly after the commencing of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan insurgents started to use Islamic fundamentalism as a means to obtain support from local Muslim communities. Later on during escalation of the conflict Al-Zawahiri stated that Victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world specifically in the Levant Egypt and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq38 and coalition forces and international public opinion realized that they witnessed the beginning of an Islamist rally a global jihad seeking political violence. Mullahs and preachers from Arab and non-Arab world promised a glorious afterlife to those who were ready to be baptized with the blood of non-believers and become martyrs.39 As a result hundreds of Muslim brothers from different parts of the world came to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to fight in the name of their God and of course in support of insurgency. This issue becomes even more critical as it has additional consequences in other global aspects. Nowadays it has been confirmed that fighters who gained combat experience from Iraq and Afghanistan are also used by terrorist networks in attacks against Christian West or in other cases they are transferred from one conflict zone to another in accordance with the insurgents plans and needs. It cannot be denied that sanctuaries in western Pakistan were used by Taliban groups and Al-Qaeda40 while in the past disenchanted Islamist groups used Afghanistan as a base for terrorist training.41 The message that insurgents are sending out is that all Muslims must stand united against western imperialism and its NATO representatives42 and that you are either with us or against us.43 The second challenge refers to practices used lately by insurgents in terms of sending messages to general public both at a national and international levels. It seems that insurgents have launched a global propaganda campaign in order to apply more pressure in the field of non-kinetic operations. Therefore negative images and videos contained imagery of violence dead bodies beheadings and depictions of individuals being mishandled are used in order to create negativity amongst the recipients as they portray a pessimistic image of life. Moreover this method applies social pressure and draws political impacts to civilized countries where human lives are of high importance and human rights are a part of their culture. This extreme campaign is facilitated by todays information revolution as today we can see ourselves from different sources what a conflict looks like.44 It is about time for international forces and respective organizations acting in the theater to regain their momentum and confront the enemy without trying to put lipstick on pigs.45 Some of the best weapons for COIN do not shoot and international community needs to use them wisely money for economic and infrastructure development governance reform industrial and agricultural development social services development through training and mentoring programs and many other actions that could be used to send out an optimistic message and discharge what is regarded by locals as the humiliation of occupation.46 The question is for how long armed forces can hold against the insurgency while the political stakeholders are still occupied by their disastrous indecisiveness. Historically speaking the per capita commitment of the USA and NATO ISAF personnel in Afghanistan is the lowest since the end of WWII.47 Finally the third challenge is that of the so-called green-on-blue threat or else an insider threat IT attack which occurs from a person or persons who have a position of trust among international troops in contradistinction to a green- on-green attack which targets native