Transformation Through Training Issue No 7 July 2015 35 credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of local and international communities. Utilization of the local government to work out those issues offers a governmental signature on all actions. Finally counterinsurgents need to know that democracy and elections do not have the same meaning and do not apply to any society of this world as it might have little to do with governments being elected and governments being popular.27 No doubt the power given to a democratically elected government by its populace is important but this power has to translate into security law order civil services and prosperity. Unity of effort There is no need to mention that unity of effort or unity of command as it is known in military COIN doctrine plays a special role within COIN operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan beside international military forces a great number of governmental GO non-governmental NGO and other international organizations IO are actively involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of the entire area thus unity of effort must be present at every dimension every level and in any daily activity. In this case the challenge to overcome is very complex since we refer to a combat system dominated by a number of players each of which has a different role and position within this system but all of them are equally important for the stability of the system. Collaboration among military and civilian entities might be an answer to this especially since the military cannot solve all COIN related issues on its own due to its structure and mission. Therefore troops can be used in a way that will create a safe path to be followed by civilian subject matters that from their side will go into deeper waters in their respective field of expertise.28 Furthermore the ideal solution would be a COIN leader military or civilian who should be given authority and power to direct all COIN aspects vertically and horizontally towards the common objective.29 However this course of action appears to be problematic in Afghanistan while in Iraq cannot bring at all the required synergy.30 Moreover reality has proven that in many cases IOs GOs and NGOs can perform better if they are allowed to stay outside of the wire meaning without falling under COIN leaders command and control.31 Therefore it would be more realistic if we should try to achieve synchronization rather than command and control. Otherwise well-intentioned efforts may turn into failures and give opportunities for insurgents to undermine the whole project. Intelligence in COIN One of the major problems in COIN operations is to track and target an enemy who is not dressed in military uniforms has no trenches or front lines and is hiding among populace.32 In a situation like this the only tool available is effective active and accurate intelligence INTEL. By definition INTEL is vital for all forms of warfare however in COIN operations INTEL is encountering an additional theoretical problem intelligence versus information. Put it in another way INTEL in COIN has a dual role from one side it emphasizes collection and analysis on current operational issues based on the traditional model who-when-where-why-how while from the other side it strives to delineate skills characteristics tactics and goals of an invisible enemy. Meanwhile insurgents consciously study and learn from their weaknesses in an attempt to become more adoptive and resilient to COIN methods which fact in many cases allow them to be one step ahead.33 Lately INTEL knowledge gained from the theater offered new perspectives in terms of sustains and improvements. To start up coalition forces realized that despite the fact that operations will be INTEL driven intelligence will come mostly from their own efforts and somehow INTEL must be pushed down to the lowest level possible to include friendly indigenous forces and vice versa.Thus all personnel are now considered as information collectors to include linguists and translators. Moreover they have improved INTEL awareness in coordination with all international organizations taking advantage from their connections with the elders and key personnel of a given area as 50 of the success of COIN INTEL relies on positive relationships with elders and religious leaders in tribal areas. Allied INTEL now emphasizes collection on social and religious networking by connecting the dots between the tribes families businesses and political organizations. Finally international military troops have to accept the chaos of not having perfect INTEL in a COIN environment. Insurgents will always surprise them and attack their weakest points what is important is that individual soldiers must identify those weak points and communicate that information effectively.34 Investing Knowledge in Future Learn and adopt In COIN the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly usually wins.35 Coalition forces should adopt LL as quickly as possible if they want to maintain their superiority in the future. The study of the two COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan corroborates the below mentioned conclusion the decline of communist ideology is irreversible nationalism remains a powerful force and religious fundamentalism is raged basically Muslim but with the possible creation of opposing tendencies in other religions. The methods of the rebels will remain basically the same but there will be adjustments to technological developments. The increasing urbanization of the population will lead to greater recourse to terrorism possibly with weapons of mass destruction but as insurgency is politically effective the most important movements are expected to use a combination of both methods. How effective will the insurgents be in the future Technological developments facilitate observation and real-time transmission of information and therefore impede the concentration of large insurgency groups.