Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 11
Page 12
Page 13
Page 14
Page 15
Page 16
Page 17
Page 18
Page 19
Page 20
Page 21
Page 22
Page 23
Page 24
Page 25
Page 26
Page 27
Page 28
Page 29
Page 30
Page 31
Page 32
Page 33
Page 34
Page 35
Page 36
Page 37
Page 38
Page 39
Page 40
Page 41
Page 42
Page 43
Page 44
Page 45
Page 46
Page 47
Page 48
34 Transformation Through Training Issue No 7 July 2015 in COIN comes from winning the hearts and minds of the population where hearts means persuading people that their best interest are served by counterinsurgents success and minds means convincing them that counterinsurgents can protect them. Therefore the objective or better say the center of gravity in a COIN campaign must be the people. That was exactly the key point in General Petraeus strategy when he tasked his forces to primary secure and serve the local population by living with it as this would eventually lead to regional stability governmental sustainability and economic growth.14 That is to say that military forces have to get out from the security of their compounds and actively set their boots on the ground so as to get in touch with people.15 One can argue that since high-tech surveillance equipment offers comparative advantages there is no reason to put soldiers lives at high risk. In this case the answer is that nothing can replace visible forces presence especially when insurgents have repeatedly shown that they can immediately adjust their tactics to new challenges more like a balloon that you squeeze one end and the enemy moves to the other.16 Another fundamental element in COIN planning procedure is the ability to involve indigenous forces as a part of the entire process. In this case there must be a preparation phase that includes recruiting training and evaluation and gradually within a reasonable period of time indigenous security forces should participate in common operations in the light of embedded partnering until finally they are capable to plan and execute their own missions. This will create a negative picture and send the right message to the natives as it will be their own people who fight for them thus it will deepen their confidence and enable responsibility and accountability.17 When there is an Iraqi-Afghan problem there is an Iraqi-Afghan solution and nothing can be done unless they decide to take over initiatives and rely on their own power until they finally manage to isolate and eradicate insurgents from their cause and support. COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have also taught us that insurgency today has the ability to receive support from national and international sources due to its global nature.18 The rise of globalization has significantly changed the way that insurgency is being fought from Madrid to London and from New York to Baghdad insurgency is leveraged by a worldwide criminal market and feeds off media that broadcasts its violence and multiplies the latters psychological impact.19 Globalization has also offered additional potential to insurgents such as access to a worldwide audience freedom of moving and communication ability to conduct financial transfers without being tracked but above all globalization allowed them to create and use active geographical space sanctuaries and virtual internet based sanctuaries that facilitated their needs and activities in terms of training indoctrination recruitment and regrouping.20 From this point of view contemporary COIN must be able to mobilize and energize all available support at all levels while in parallel it must assume initiatives and establish measures in order to prevent its rivals from doing the same.21 Finally time is of critical importance and must be included in the planning as well. Usually policymakers provide time frames and expect troops to be withdrawn from the theater accordingly however it should be underlined that COIN is a time consuming effort and often its duration is a question without a clear answer.22 As mentioned before COIN is directly related to indigenous populace whose reaction cannot be measured in advance. Lack of tactical patience in COIN operations contributes to missed opportunities and intelligence failures and sometimes waiting collecting information reporting and doing nothing is the best reaction. Legitimacy Insurgents primary objective is to delegitimize the current political system and its representatives while in parallel they are seeking ways to legitimize their struggle and translate this into sympathy and vital support from internal and external actors. The key method that insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan use to legitimize their actions are ideas of self-determination and sovereignty therefore the use of violence from their side is justified as a result of chasing a political objective. In addition insurgents through demonstration of moral superiority over state forces try to create their image of martyrs who are ready to sacrifice themselves for freedom and independence of their homeland.23 The idea behind this is that the moral justification for the purpose of a political goal self-determination and sovereignty will generate indigenous and international sympathizers ready to provide support and mainly legitimation for the use of violence in order for them to overset the current status.24 Theoretically governments described as legitimate rule primarily with blank acceptance and support of their citizens without the fear of consequences as long as their activities stay within a reasonably predefined frame. On the other hand the primary responsibility of any government is to provide security to its people. In COIN operations this might be turn out to be problematic and become Achilles heel. Indeed no government can claim full consent from the governed side unless it is able to provide them with security and thus securing populace requires efficient and continuous employment of security forces. The overall concept is quite challenging since it requires ability to maintain control over an overwhelming force without causing a negative impact to the local populace.25 As a response to this action insurgents will try to provoke and undermine the governments effort by drawing it into a game of attrition where insurgents usually have an advantage in delegitimizing the states efforts.26 Practically speaking insurgents seek to have the government and coalition forces do their work for them. This overreaction is exactly what insurgents are looking for so as to drive the populace or international opinion into their hands. Counterinsurgents bottom-up efforts should align top-down initiatives dealing with daily civic issues impunity and the negative influence of parallel structures that attack governments