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28 Transformation Through Training Issue No 7 July 2015 not just Muslim loyalty to the Crown but that of many other minorities. Without any alternative for strengthening the collective identity calls for integration moderacy and cohesion have hence become not only monochrome and divisive but intolerant dependent on the endorsement of populist votes and profoundly dangerous especially for those with their own identities traditions values religions and historic proven notions of patriotism and loyalty. As a result the generational struggle has become a strategy in itself and an indictment of the commitment to thwarting the Islamic threat on its own merits and obtaining the resources needed to rally Muslims around the Crown and directly engage the insurgency. It is hence argued that open-ended conflict with a vaguely defined enemy will continue to lead not just to a surge in apocalyptic behaviour and treasonous rhetoric from elements of the Muslim population but the fraying of traditional tensions between groups that have existed peacefully in these islands for many years groups that have not only characterised the pluralistic nature of British democracy but the tangled web of loyalties that have held the United Kingdom together for centuries. Given the artificial and untested nature of the doctrine it is believed that the strategy would neither last the test of time nor the economic political and social impact of a bombing campaign. It must equally be pointed out that the insurgency has in any case little concept or appreciation of the Wests approach to time and has been well embedded for many decades. Hence with the generational approach the enemy has the advantage of time and is able to exploit the policy of non-engagement that characterizes the reactive episodic approach of this government. What is at risk here is greater than living with terrorism the pluralistic nature of the countrys democracy a clash between the secular and religious forces of the population and a window of opportunity for the enemy to exploit and para-militarise its British contingents. PART III Gunpowder Treason Plot Attacks to Come In that one of the most striking features of Islamic terrorism is the destabilizing nature of its mere presence crucial are the implications of counter-terrorism measures having failed to adequately address its religious and apocalyptic faade. The extreme to which this has affected the public is extraordinary and turned what was little other than a terrorist organization into a phenomenon with revolutionary global proportions. Counter-terrorism responses to Islamic fundamentalism have hence not only failed in challenging the faade but in protecting contemporary views of British Muslims from subversion. Indeed as one of the most striking political features of the early 20th century was the repeated destabilizing nature of militant violence and the reaction or lack of reaction to its realpolitik the far reaching consequences of Islamic terrorism in this century must not be underestimated. The consequences of focusing on home-grown terrorism as opposed to the nature of the exported imported threat are hence not only cyclical in that they continue to fail to address this politick but vulnerable in that they can be framed and exploited by the enemy as an anti-Islamic offensive against what could be portrayed as an isolated immigrant minority population. Furthermore as counter- terrorism is not designed to indent upon the cohesiveness of any incumbent insurgency it not only fails to prosecute the weaknesses of these forces but exacerbates the politics behind them. Whilst jailing terrorists and criminalising their actions may indeed be of value to delegitimising their cause it underestimates the intensity and ferocity of the non-violent conflict and overestimates the weight of any convictions. To divest Islamic terrorism of its political capabilities and strategic reach it is hence necessary to protect Muslim populations from any subversive or insurgent activity and rendezvous with the connections outlined above in the Woolwich attack. Both the engagement of British nationals loyal to forces beyond the Crown abroad and the public interdiction of treasonable activity at home would offer better protection than generational projects in social engineering community policing and counter-terrorism. The reason for this is twofold 1 Islamic terrorists in the UK have as yet to go blind in an all-out directive to force a crisis of legitimacy for the government and the targeted communities 2 Islamic insurgents have barely developed beyond the incipient stage i.e. because engaging the insurgency as a foreign intrinsic strategic and symbiotic component of the enemys gestalt in its early stages increases the likelihood of an earlier visible and quantifiable victory. The consequences of failing to halt the militant forces of Islam are wrought with danger an increase in the violent rejection of society by Muslims and the reticent forces of republicanism an increase in propaganda of the deed illegalism demonstrative bloodshed terror and wide-scale treason - all traits of the modern incipient stage and responses to long-term counter- terrorism initiatives. It must not be forgotten that as with the strategic corporal of a 21st century conventional