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22TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo6December2014Thatmuchofitwasbasedonadietoffastfoodresearchthatwasquickcheapready-to-handandnutritionallydubiousSilke2001notonlyenabledtheprotagoniststokeeppacewiththeincreasingappetiteforwarbutwitheventsonthegroundastheyunfoldedonbothsidesoftheconflict911hadinjectedasenseofrighteousnessandpurposeintothemoralvacuumofthepost-ColdWareraandnewterrorismhadgivenitdirection.AstheWaronTerrorprogressedhowevertheconsequencesofwhatinevitablyledtoadeepeningintheschismintheanalysisofAlQaedabegantofractureacademicresearchandasBjornehedarguedasearlyas2003encouragepoliticiansintotakingextremenon-negotiablepositions.ThiseffectivelyruledoutanypoliticalengagementwiththeTalibanafterToraBoraforexampleandlaidthefoundationsforthesuccessionofanalysesofAlQaedathatprojectedSalafistinterpretationsontowhathadhithertobeenunderstoodaslittleotherthanamilitantextensionofthefanaticismexperiencedbypractitionersduringthe1980sinAfghanistan-nothinghadbeenlearnedfromtheYugoslavAlgerianandMercenaryUnitswhohadfoughtagainstthefirstwaveofMujahedeenForcesduringthe1990sacrosstheBalkansandNorthAfrica.ThenewwarasU.S.administrationofficialstermedtheviolencethatbeganSeptember11isthusnotsonew.ItisacontinuationandescalationofpreviouspatternsofviolenceinvolvingMuslims.HuntingtonsAgeofMuslimWars2001ThisnewreligiousterrorismnotonlycompoundedthethreatoutlinedinSternsTheUltimateTerrorists1999andBenjaminsarticleAmericaandtheNewTerrorism2000butconfirmedjustificationforfurtherentrenchingagainstasecond911orWMDattackandconsolidatedcounter-terrorisminitiativesintopositionsfromwhichtodebunkwouldhavebeenpoliticalsuicide.WithinweeksoftheattackonNewYorkArticle5oftheWashingtonTreatywasinvokedforthefirsttimeinNATOshistoryandhundredsofthousandsofmenandbillionsofdollarsofresourcesweremobilizedPresidentBushsrhetorichadnegatedanyroomforneutralityandwiththePatriotActputthecountryontoawarfooting.JustthreedaysbeforeAlQaedaslaststandatToraBoraonDecember17th2001themostdraconianlegislationinpeacetimeinoveracenturyTomkins2002hadbeenpassedintheUKsecularismpatriotismandAtlanticismhadbecomethehallmarksofthehome-frontandfragilecoalitionsthedeathknellofage-olddtentes-aseismicshiftingeopoliticalalliancesandthevaluesofoncehithertopassivetolerantliberaldemocracies.PoliticalAnalysisAdecadelaterandwiththebenefitofhindsightRichardEnglish2009cappedtheliteraturethathadbeenslowlytakingthedebatebacktoearlieranalysesofAlQaedainthewakeof911.ByarguingthattheWaronTerrorhadspectacularlyfailedtoaddresswhatAlQaedaconstitutedhemadeacaseforaradicallynewapproachtodealingwithinternationalterrorismthatinplaceofsettlingforanunendingwaragainstitthemodernworldhadtolearntolivewithit.ToadegreethisroundedoffthecallsofotheracademicworkssuchasSagemansUnderstandingTerrorNetworks2004inwhichitwasarguedthatthemilitaryresponsehadfailedandthattheonlyeffectivedefenseagainstAlQaedawastocounterthewebofrelationshipsintowhichithadmetamorphosedafterToraBora.InthatoneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofAlQaedaisthedestabilizingnatureofitsmerepresencecrucialtoboththeseargumentsisanunderstandingoftheovershadowingofitspoliticalobjectivesbythedynamismofitsreligiouspropagandaandapocalypticfaade.Theextremetowhichthisaffectedcounter-terrorismresponsesalthoughrelativeinanhistoricalcontexthadgivenitrevolutionaryglobalproportionsandturnedwhatwaslittleotherthanaterroristorganizationintoaphenomenonthathaschangedtheworld.HencecounterterrorismresponsestoAlQaedahavenotonlyredefinedmanyoftheconceptsofmodernwarfarebutcontemporaryWesternvaluesandterrorismitself.AnotherreasonforthisisthatbycounteringAlQaedaasareligiouslymotivatedmovementasopposedtoapoliticallymotivatedonetheresponseswerelargelybasedonaprioriknowledgethattendedtobelievethatterrorismwasmoredangerousoratleastmoredifficulttocounterthanitspredecessorTucker2001.FurthermoreandperhapsmoreimportantlythegoalofwinningsetbythecontextofwarhadreinforcedthebaselessconvictionthatthewaragainstAlQaedawouldbemeasureablequantifiableandconventionalaconceptthatwassupportedbyinitialmilitaryactionontheground.TherealityonthegroundhoweverwasfarfrommeasureabletheUnitedStateshadnotonlydeclaredwaronanenemygroupofcombatantswithacommonanthologyandwithastrategytowhichtheyhadpaidinsufficientattentionGartenstein-Ross2011butthecultureofaparticularperiodintime-azeitgeist.HencealthoughtheAlQaedaof911hadebbedanddiedbythetimethetideofToraBoraturnedtheresonanceofitsdrowninghadrippledoutacrossaworldthatstretchedfromCasaBlancatoJakarta.BroadeningthefightbeyondAfghanistantoincludeIraqasGartensteinarguedwoulderodeAmericanpowerandprovideAlQaedawitharemarkableopportunitytoreconstitute.IndeedthelackofreactiontoanalysesofAlQaedaasapoliticalorganizationwithrealpolitikandpracticalachievableobjectivesasopposedtoidealisticnon-negotiabledemandsledifanywheretothedemocratizationofboththegroupanditsideology.HistoricalContextIn2007CrenshawsummarizedthelimitedscopeoftheanalysesofAlQaedathatledtotheWaronTerrorbyarguing