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TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo6December201415componentintermsofpreferenceforanapproachmorehistoricalthandescriptive.Inthiscontextitisworthtounderlinethatmeanwhileamindisusingdeductivewaysitisexcludinginductiveonesthatwhenwechooseananalyticalapproachwerejectaholisticoneandsoon.ForexamplemostofthetimesoutcomelogicisthepreferredonetoaccomplishtheFactorAnalysisduringPhase3Aoftheplanningprocess.Itispre-ferredbecauseanalysisanddeductioneasilymatchtheFactorDeductionConclusionprocessthatisproposedinCOPD.HoweverthecoreoftheJOPGshouldrememberthatinformationisnotknowledgeandthatknowledgeonlyincreaseswhenacorrela-tionbetweendataisestablished.Moreovermanytimesthedatacannotbeconsideredseparatelybecausewhenitisconsideredseparatelyitisnolongerunderstandable.InthisregardaFactorAnalysismayrequireasignificantportionofdesignlogicandaspecificteamshouldbetailoredtoapplyholisticthinkingandtoconsiderthehistori-calevolutionofmanyofthosefactors.Thiswouldavoidthedangerofsomeconclusionsthatintheirisolatedrationalperfectionhidetrueicebergsthatcanderailtheprocess.ContinuingtheaboveexampletheabuseoftheoutcomelogiccanbestillworsewhenCentreofGravityAnalysisisbuiltontheexclusivebasisofafragmentedFactorAnalysisasiftheCentreofGravityweretheripefruitthatemergesfromtheCriticalCapabilitiesCriticalRequirementsandCriticalVulnerabilitiesidentifiedascon-clusionsofthatanalyticanddeductivepro-cess.Thenoneoftheprivilegespacesfortheapplicationofthedialecticlogicissacrificedtotheoutcomeoneandtheidentificationofthathubofallpowerandmovementonwhicheverythingdepends24restondeductiveinsteadofinductivewayofreasoningviolatingtheindivisiblenatureofthewarwhenlookingforadecisiveoutcome25thatultimatelyjusti-fiestheexistenceofanyCentreofGravity.Thelistofexamplescouldbemuchlongerandmostofthemarereferredtothenaturalattractionoftheoutcomelogic.ThisisreasonablebecauseitsstructuraloriginanditsanalyticalimplementationmakeiteasytodivideanyjobintoseveralpartsabasicneedofanyJOGPandalsoprovidestheillusionofmathematicalcertaintiestobepresentedtothecommander.Thentocontinuethepreviousexampletheoperationsdesignisnottheresultofcreativeandholisticthink-ingwithastronghistoricalfootprintbutacollectionofdecisiveconditionsobtainedinthatanalyticalprocessandthecoursesofactiondevelopmentevenwhenweareexercisingconventionalwarfarecanreplacedialecticallogicforthedistributionofthosedecisiveconditionsalongtimeandspaceasifaCOAwereasortoftargetingprocessdistributedgeographicallyandtemporally.Finallynotonlydotheplanningandconductofoperationsrequireaddressingawiderangeofveryheterogeneousproblemsthatdemandtheuseofeitherlogicasappro-priatebutalsothereisalwaysaparentlogicthatactsasaguidingthread.Thatletsiden-tifythewholebusinessofwarcompletelywithhimself26thataccordingtoClausewitzprovidesthefreedomtodominateeventsandnotbedominatedbythem27.TheabilityofaTrainingObservertoidentifytherightlogictoeachoftheCOPDprocessesandespeciallyfortheG5J5TrainingObservertheparentlogicthatshouldguidethewholeprocesscon-stitutesaprerequisiteforacoherentTTworkthataddsvaluetothejobofanyJOPG.1ComprehensiveOperationsPlanningDirectiveissuedbyAlliedCommandOperationstoarticulatetheoperationsplanningprocessfortheNATOstrategicandoperationallevels.2BI-SC75-3p.A-36.3MATTISJamesN.MemorandumforU.S.JointForcesCommand.VisionforaJointApproachtoOperationalDesignNorfolkOctober2009.4Sincewarcontainsahostofinteractionssincethewholeseriesofengagementsisstrictlyspeak-inglinkedtogetherWithintheconceptofabsolutewarthenwarisindivisibleanditscom-ponentpartsareofvalueonlyintherelationwiththewholeCLAUSEWITZCarlVon.OnwarPrincetonUniversityPressNewJersey1984p.5825CLAUSEWITZCarlVonop.cit.p.112.6Alltheseresearchesmadesignificantcontribu-tionstowinningthewaraswellastodevelop-ingthemethodologyofoperationsresearchSHRADERCharlesR.HistoryofOperationsResearchintheUnitedStatesArmyV.IOfficeofthedeputyundersecretaryoftheArmyforOperationsResearchUnitedStatesArmyWashington-D.C.2006p.12.7wemustdevelopanewconceptualframeworkforoperations.Thebasisforthisframe-workisfoundintheimprovedcommandcontrolandintelligencewhichcanbeassuredbyinforma-tionsuperiority.Thesearethemoststraightforwardapplicationsofmuchofthenewtechnologyhoweverthefullimpactofthesetechnologiesismoreprofound.EnhancedcommandandcontrolandmuchimprovedintelligencealongwithotherapplicationsofnewtechnologywilltransformthetraditionalfunctionsofmaneuverstrikeprotectionandlogisticsU.S.JOINTCHIEFSOFSTAFFJointVision20101996p.19.8Cf.NAVEHSimon.InPursuitofMilitaryExcellence.TheevolutionofOperationalTheoryFrankCassNewYork1997p.15.9Cf.NAVEHSimon.op.cit.p.233.10Cf.KIPPJacobW.MassMobilityAndTheRedArmysRoadToOperationalArt1918-1936SovietArmyStudiesOfficeFortLeavenworth-KS1988.11FRANKWillardandGILLETEPhilipS.SovietMilitaryDoctrinefromLenintoGorbachev1915-1991GreenwoodPressWestport-CT1992p.88.12SVECHINAleksandrA.StrategyEastViewPublicationsMinneapolis-MN1992p.38.13Cf.GLANTZDavidM.SovietMilitaryOperationalArt.InpursuitofDeepBattleFrankCassNewYork1991p.25.14Cf.Ibdemp.13.15USDepartmentoftheArmyFM100-5Operations1982and1986.16VEGOMilanN.SystemversusClassicalApproachtoWarfareJFQissue521stquarter2009p.42.17SMITHRupertTheUtilityofForceAlfredA.KnoffNewYork2007p.3.18BANACHStefanJ.TheArtofDesignadesignmethodologyMilitaryReviewMarch-April2009p.107.19BANACHStefanJop.cit.p.107.20Cf.ZWEIBELSONBen.ToDesignornottoDesignSmallWarsJournal2011.21JACOBJane.TheDeathandLifeofGreatAmericanCitiesVintageBooksNewYork1992p.433.22MATTISJamesNop.cit.23Ibdem.24CLAUSEWITZCarlVonop.cit.p.595.25Cf.CLAUSEWITZCarlVonop.cit.BookVIIICh.3.A.InterdependenceoftheElementsofWar.26CLAUSEWITZCarlVonop.cit.p.578.27Ibdemp.578.