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JFTC: The Home of CWIX

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„Transformation Through Training“

The aim of this magazine is to provide a forum for exchange of information and expertise among training and educational institutions across NATO in the area of training, military professional education, and related technological support. In the context of The NATO “Smart Defense” approach, there is growing importance for cooperation with partner states and international organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. With the above in mind, the JFTC invites authors from countries and institutions beyond the NATO environment, to publish in the Transformation Through Training magazine. The magazine will focus on the best practices in the areas of command and staff training, professional military education, simulations and simulation technologies, distributed training, military training development, and other related areas. The JFTC also welcomes recommendations for the application of the most recent experience and lessons learned from ongoing operations, training events and recent innovations in the field of simulations and information technologies. The magazine will also briefly cover the life of the international community at the JFTC aiming at promotion of the centre within NATO and among the partner nations. The magazine will be published twice a year, during the spring and fall, by the NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz.

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JFTC: The Home of CWIX

LTC Daniel Pawlak,
JFTC CWIX OPR

"It was another exceptionally good experience for us" said Mr. Kell Hvolbol, the Deputy Director of CWIX from HQ SACT, summarizing the execution of CWIX 2012. CWIX stands for the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration, Experimentation, Examination, Exercise. The annual event was conducted at JFTC from 4-21 June 2012 for the second time since the transition of the event from Lillehammer, Norway where CWIX was conducted for the previous seven years. CWIX is an annual NATO Military Committee-directed and Consultation, Command & Control Board-guided event that focuses on improving the interoperability of NATO and National Command & Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities with emphasis on those deployed to NATO-led operations or planned for the use in NATO Response Force operations.

This year with more than 800 participants on site at JFTC, CWIX 2012 became the single largest event in the center's history at the local level, but also continued to expand JFTC's capability to conduct distributed events.

The number of Nations and NATO agencies participating in CWIX has continued to grow. This year several countries joined the CWIX exercise for the first time as observers, including Albania, Czech Republic, Australia, and South Korea. Typically when a country joins CWIX in observer status their national participants become part of the Analysis Team, a job that definitely gives the participants a deep understanding of CWIX execution. Making the transition from observer status to active participation this year were Bulgaria, Hungary, and Norway. In total, 16 nations actively participated with capability testing and six nations participated as observers.

In addition to the new participating nations, the Military Medicine Centre of Excellence, the Joint Chemical Biological Radiation & Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence and the NATO Special Operational Forces Headquarters participated in CWIX 2012.

During his briefing to the Military Committee on CWIX VIP day LTC Stephan Siemens, the ACT Director of CWIX, described the CWIX network as a kind of prototype for the Future Mission Network. During the first two days of CWIX the par-

ticipating nations arrived with a variety of network-enabled computer equipment and worked with JFTC's CWIX Network Lead, Mr. Fulvio Postogna, and the combined JFTC Computer & Information Systems and InfoSec & NCSA Squadron Bydgoszcz team to set up SECRET-level networks for NATO and for each participating Nation and connect them together. Their intent was to share the information that participants wanted to share in order to conduct interoperability tests, and protect the information that needed to be protected in order to maintain the integrity of NATO and National classified information.

The main exercise was executed on the SECRET part of the CWIX network running on CFBLNet. In addition to the local network at JFTC in Bydgoszcz 14 additional remote sites were connected, including NATO sites and sites in the United States, Australia, France, Germany and Italy. Alongside the SECRET network an UNCLASSIFIED network was established, including wireless capability, to test mobile computing capabilities and other unclassified systems. A third completely isolated network provided an environment for CYBER-DEFENCE activities.

CWIX is closely coordinated with other testing events such as Steadfast Cobalt, Combined Endeavour and Afghan Mission Network assurance and validation to make sure that interoperability testing remains relevant, current, and valuable to warfighters. In times of shrinking budgets this coordination is vital to bring relevant capabilities to the field and to ensure interoperability with already fielded NATO and National systems. In coordination with the ACT CWIX Team and the Steadfast Cobalt organizers, JFTC will continue to examine the possibility of bringing Steadfast Cobalt together with CWIX in Bydgoszcz, Poland in the coming years.

The CWIX Focus Areas are not constant from year-to-year, but are instead formed and disbanded depending on the testing objectives of the participating Nations. At the beginning of each planning cycle the Senior Management Group, based on Overarching Guidance from the C3 Board, as well as National and NATO agency testing objectives, determines what the specific Focus Areas will be for the following year, and leadership of the Focus Areas is established through voluntary National contributions based upon technical expertise of participating National representatives. This Focus Area structure also makes it straightforward for the analysis working group to assign subject matter experts to specific areas in order to observe and report on test results.

CWIX Focus Areas

- Mobile Computing
- Cloud Computing
- Cyber Defense
- CIVMIL
- Geospatial
- Joint Fires
- JISR
- Logistics/Medical
- MIP
- MLS
- MTF
- SOA

Over the years, CWIX Focus Areas have grown from basic component level testing to specialized testing. The Focus Area organization is unique in that it gives system developers the opportunity to come together with other system developers with similar testing objectives for their respective capabilities to discuss testing planned for the execution period. Their detailed coordination took place at three planning conferences over the course of the preceding year. By the end of the final planning conference, each participating Nation and NATO organization had not only determined which capabilities they wanted to bring to CWIX execution for testing, but had also documented their interoperability test partners, specific tests they planned to conduct, and test success criteria.

In CWIX there are systems in the earliest experimentation stage, and there are systems that are testing upgrades to fielded operational systems. There are NATO systems and National Systems. There are systems that are or will be deployed on the Afghan Mission Network or Future Mission Network, and others that will never be deployed on those networks. One thing they all have in common is that the system developers and National Representatives recognize the importance of testing their systems

in an operations-like environment.

This year JFTC was not only the physical site where the majority of CWIX participants gathered to conduct their work, but was also fully integrated with the execution of the event as a NATO organization testing its own capabilities. In order to provide the operations-like environment desired by the National Representatives the JFTC Computer-Assisted Exercise (CAX) team provided a scenario, in cooperation with NC3A and the Joint Warfare Centre and under the leadership of Mr. Nigel Puttock, the CWIX Scenario Working Group Lead.

Of course most of the tests at CWIX are of a very technical nature, where system engineers are concerned with proper encoding, decoding, and translation of message formats, for example. But during the second week of testing once the scenario was underway, tests are facilitated not only by system engineers, but also by operators – that is, military functional area operators use their functional area systems within the context of the scenario.

During the planning conferences, in order to conduct capability interoperability tests within the context of the scenario, the component command leads developed Friendly ORBATs appropriate for their Nations and system types. During CWIX execution the JFTC CAX Team provided the scenario and also directly stimulated some of the Command and Control systems with simulated friendly, neutral, and enemy air tracks. While this was an important contribution to CWIX, it was also a valuable experience for our CAX Branch to test the interactions and interoperability of JFTC's NATO Live Virtual Constructive simulation tools with a wide variety of NATO and National C4ISR systems. This experience will be directly applicable to JFTC's primary mission of training NATO soldiers preparing for deployment to NATO operations if a requirement to train National Functional Area Systems during NATO training events emerges. The interaction between the simulation tools and C4ISR systems may also have a direct application to operational planning and wargaming.

One may get a glimpse of the scope of interoperability testing during this year's CWIX once it begins to sink in that the 16 actively participating nations, together with more than a dozen participating NATO Commands and Agencies, brought more than 140 C4ISR systems to test. About six percent of those systems participated from distributed locations.

Experiments contributed by JFTC and JWC, which will directly impact the development of the training capabilities of our two training centers as well as JFTC's capacity to support future CWIX events, are related to cloud computing infrastructure and modeling and simulation interaction with Functional

Area Systems. In explaining the military benefits of cloud computing, it may be useful to also describe one or two of the challenges associated with executing this computing intensive event in a training center that was not originally designed for such events.

In 2011, the first year that CWIX was held at JFTC, the CWIX Land Component Command (LCC) and associated systems were located in the part of JFTC's training area normally used for the Combined Joint Operations Center (CJOC). The CJOC is a room-within-a-room, and with all of the CWIX LCC servers in that room, it became uncomfortably warm, and quite noisy due to continuously operating computer fans. In 2012 all of the CWIX servers were relocated to a more open and isolated part of the training area, with the intent to dissipate the heat better, and keep the noise and heat away from participants. While the participants were indeed less affected by the heat and noise generated by the servers, the servers themselves were again under some heat stress.

If, in 2013, some participating CWIX Nations and Agencies were to run virtualized machines on JFTC cloud computing infrastructure, many problems such as risking heat stress, power failure, difficulties with customs or other costs or complications with physical equipment logistics might be avoided, and more physical space would be available for CWIX participants. Of course many other issues of a technical nature might arise, but CWIX is a perfect venue to work through those issues.

While the interoperability testing of the systems is the reason system engineers came to Poland, there are many things happening behind-the-scenes to keep everything running smoothly, and there are many opportunities to build strong working relationships and friendships. Managing everything from parking and fences to tents and equipment logistics, Maj Tomasz Langnerowicz and Capt Katarzyna Fiedur and the JFTC Support Unit had their hands full. Poland also provided a Coalition Information Assurance Team, led by Capt Tomasz Janiak, to protect the event against cyber-attack and to test the security vulnerabilities of CWIX capabilities if desired by capability leads. LTC Ryszard Zdun, Polish General Staff, together with Ms. Maria Kowalska and the JFTC Protocol Team hosted several social events to provide CWIX National Representatives, Focus Area Leads, and more than 100 visiting VIPs the chance to share their thoughts with one another. JFTC and NATO are very grateful to Poland for the crucial role the Host Nation played in this regard.

Following the CWIX Final Planning Conference in March 2012, LTC Siemens met with JFTC Commander MG Pavel Macko. During their discussion they stated that JFTC was an excellent site for CWIX Execution and agreed that the ACT-led CWIX will continue at JFTC in Bydgoszcz for the foreseeable future. In practical terms this means that, until at least 2017, JFTC is the Home of CWIX! ■

CWIX from My Perspective

Interview with Major General Jaap Willemse, the Assistant Chief of Staff Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence (ACOS C4I) at Allied Command Transformation

Sir,

As Assistant Chief of Staff Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence (ACOS C4I) at Allied Command Transformation you are responsible for the NATO Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise (CWIX). In June you visited CWIX 2012 which was held at the JFTC in Bydgoszcz.

What does CWIX stand for and can you explain what it is?

CWIX is an Experiment, it's Exploration, it's an Exercise. It addresses interoperability within NATO when it comes to Command and Control systems. Normally NATO does not own any systems, so it's the nations that provide the systems. We have to make sure that they can interoperate and when we deploy and when we go on an operation that we are able to communicate and exchange information and data. And that's what we are trying to do at CWIX.

What is the importance of CWIX for ACT?

CWIX is a very important first step when you start to talk about capability development. ACT has several major focus areas, one is of course training, one is policy and plans, and the other one is capability development. Especially if we are talking about capability development CWIX is a very important first step before we move further into the development of capabilities for NATO.

What is ACT's role in CWIX?

ACT's role is basically the organiser, the facilitator of the experiment and of the testing. It is the nations and some of the NATO Commands for example Joint Forces Commands and Allied Command Operation that are the biggest players. We are basically facilitating the whole event.

How did CWIX get started and what was the reason that it got started?

CWIX got started as a demonstration to show and to try to get the systems in together and it has grown ever since. Now, it can be seen in a whole sequence of the life-cycle of capabilities. We start off with the exploration, and the basic interoperability testing, then we go into a NRF scenario where we try to qualify the nations and then they will deploy into theatre. Actually, from purely demonstration events we went into an interoperability exercise and prove the interoperability before nations send for instance their capabilities into the ISAF operations.

What goes into the planning for such a highly technical event as CWIX?

It is about a one year planning. We set objectives for the CWIX at the beginning of the sequence, then the nations will subscribe with systems, with capabilities. We set special targets for every single year, for this year for instance we have cyber defense for the

first time on the agenda. It depends a little bit on the request of the nations, it depends on our ambitions, how we're going to tailor it every year.

Why does NATO need this type of an event?

NATO needs CWIX because we don't have time to test the actual interoperability of the systems, when we are going into the operations. NATO needs the ability to exchange information and data. We want to make sure that we have solved the major problems before we go on operation.

Who are the participants of CWIX?

We have about 16 participating nations right now and we have some observer nations, and those range from NATO nations, to nations where we have a partnership relationship to contact nations. For the first time we have South Korea here, Australia is present, Finland and Sweden are very active. They are well-advanced partner nations, they test their systems against NATO systems.

How does CWIX fit into the Alliance's essential core tasks ?

The ISAF operation is driving a lot of transformation, a lot of focus from the nations when we're talking about interoperability. The ISAF, as it looks right now, will wind down, and even in the end will stop. We need to have something to maintain that focus on interoperability. We have two very important initiatives right now, the smart defence and the connected forces initiative. They focus I think rightly so on the post ISAF area. How are we going to make sure that nations maintain their focus on the interoperability when it comes to their command and control systems? I think to maintain that momentum, to keep the nations testing their systems, to make them ready for any future operations, we need something like CWIX. CWIX is about making every use of current technology, it's about developing and experimenting on future technologies all focus at interoperable forces that can be deployed under the NATO umbrella. So, when it comes to the post ISAF area, I think CWIX is crucial in trying to maintain that interoperability. ■

The questions have been asked by
JWC Media and JFTC PAO.

The NATO Military Committee Visit to "the Capital of the NATO IT World"

4 - 21 June 2012

LTC Jaroslav Barilla,
Military Assistant to the JFTC Commander

June 2012, another busy month for the JFTC, nothing special for the centre conducting various training events, conferences and courses. Nothing special for a centre that is receiving dozens of VIP visitors each year. Yet, there is something unusual, worth mentioning, something that does not happen every day.

Paraphrasing General Mieczysław Cieniuch, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, one of many visitors during the recent period, "Bydgoszcz has become the capital of NATO's Information Technology (IT) for three weeks". From 4 to 21 June 2012, the JFTC for the second time hosted the Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise (CWIX), a major initiative to test, assess, and improve the interoperability of NATO and National Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems with particular emphasis on ones to be deployed with NATO-led operations such as ISAF, Active Endeavor and KFOR or within NATO Response Forces.

The CWIX is an annual event, but in 2012 was special, because of the visit of Supreme Allies Commander Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial, the Host Nation Chief of the General Staff, General Mieczysław Cieniuch, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, the NATO Military Committee and because of the visit of dozens of national VIPs as well as representatives of various international bodies. Why such a high profile "family" gathered in one place? The answer is simple. The CWIX event is an ACT-led event, approved by the NATO Military Committee and hosted at the JFTC in Bydgoszcz. The word is out about the success of CWIX 2011 and CWIX 2012 has grown bigger with 14 participating NATO countries, with 5 participating partner countries even from distant New Zealand and South Korea, with 13 participating NATO HQs and institutions involved in testing. Also, the CWIX has a lot to say about the "Connected Forces Initiative" and because it has a direct link to the "Smart Defense Initiative".

All the above explains why the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial, in close cooperation with the JFTC Commander Major General Pavel Macko, have decided to invite the Military Committee (MC) members to observe the event and while at the JFTC, to become familiar with its capabilities and the state of the art compound.

The visit of the distinguished guests, General Stéphane Abrial, General Mieczysław Cieniuch and members of Military Committee led by the Dean of MC, General Poul Kiærskou took place from 14 to 15 June 2012. The first day of the visit was exclusively devoted to the CWIX. All VVIP guests attending CWIX VIP Day learned about progress of the event and all aspects of CWIX and had also an opportunity to observe respective experiments and trials. On that occasion, the Host Nation Poland, prepared a reception at the JFTC.

The JFTC Commander, Major General

Pavel Macko opened the Press Point by welcoming distinguished guests and said the JFTC was glad to host the event because it was testing the real life support we could provide, in terms of CIS services and in general, also our flexibility. The JFTC also had a chance to test some of its capabilities such as Distributed Training and NATO Live Virtual Simulation Hub. Hosting CWIX, the JFTC is also positioning itself on the NATO transformation and capability-building roadmap in direct support of the Smart Defense Initiative.

"I am very interested in the outcome of the exercise and I am looking forward to the report." – stated General Abrial, the head of the Allied Command Transformation, the Command responsible for the CWIX program. *"We have no results yet, but we can talk about the success already. We managed to gather all these people here."* – the SACT underlined. *"We have experts representing military and industry here, we have programmers. They all communicate with each other, they exchange experience, information and, what is the most important, they have the possibility to examine if the systems they work with are compatible with each other."*

Lieutenant General Poul Kiaerskou, the Dean of the NATO Military Committee underlined that although the tests conducted in Bydgoszcz are virtual, they prepare soldiers representing different countries to cooperate during their mission in Afghanistan. *„More than one thousand soldiers from 22 countries*

participate in this training in Bydgoszcz. Not only do we want to test national forces, but also we want to examine forces which work together in coalition in Afghanistan".

The second day of the visit was aimed at demonstration of preparations for current ISAF "heavy" training events and process of transition of training to the after ISAF period. The JFTC Commander opened the briefing with words: *"For almost eight years JFTC has provided state of the art joint tactical level training support to Allied Commanders and their staffs, as well as the military advisory teams in line with its motto: "Transformation Through Training". Today, there are numerous Regional Commands and dozens of advisory teams successfully deployed into the ISAF mission, which were trained here at the JFTC"*. Later, the Commander explained basic principles of the proposal for a new set up for Collective Training of NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure under ACT control. This caused lots of questions and a lively discussion. After conclusion of the program at the JFTC, the MC visited another NATO entity in Bydgoszcz garrison, 3rd NATO Signal Battalion, where briefings and demonstrations illustrated current status of development of this NATO institution.

Commander Pavel Macko and the whole JFTC Leadership accompanied the MC representatives to the Bydgoszcz International Airport and saluted while the MC took off accompanied by 2 Polish MIGs-29. ■

International Gender Flag Officer Seminar at SWE National Defense College

■ **CDR Jan Dunmurray,**
Commander of the SWEDINT Centre for Gender in Military Operations

From 22 to 23 of May, the newly established Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations hosted a gender seminar, where international flag officers, ambassadors and representatives from NATO, the UN and the EU came together to discuss gender in the military/security context. The seminar was attended by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, who highlighted the necessity of using a gender perspective in armed conflicts. All participants agreed upon the importance of integrating gender perspectives in military and security operations, as they all agreed to make the seminar an annual event.

This was the first international flag officer seminar arranged by the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM), gathering a number of experienced officers, PhDs as well as NATO- EU- and UN representatives to discuss how working with gender perspectives in a military/security environment contributes to the overall political, military strategic and operational objectives. In order to achieve a long term solution on gender implementation in security operations the seminar presented several highly respected guests and lecturers who shared their experiences and lessons learned. The main purpose of this seminar was to raise the shared knowledge on how gender perspectives can be integrated into daily work as well as in operational planning, execution and evaluation at the strategic and operational levels, by using a comprehensive approach as the model to fully integrate gender perspectives into military operations.

During the first day the fundamental groundwork was placed in order to understand the function of UNSCR 1325 and this was completed by a lecture and discussion with Ms Margot Wallström, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Ms Wallström is finishing her mission in the upcoming days and told the audience that she will leave her post with a heavy heart but with hope for the future.

The second day was introduced by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial, who addressed the seminar via video from his headquarters in Norfolk, USA. General Abrial explained the effort ACT put into the implementing of a gender perspective at all levels within NATO Forces and Command structure.

The seminar participants received general knowledge about gender in relation to related documents, policies, guidelines and directives, as well as gained understanding of using a gender perspective as an operational tool and force multiplier. This was completed by the ability to use a comprehensive approach and a gender perspective, how to cooperate in the arena between civilian, humanitarian, military and other security actors.

The working process during the seminar consisted of several methods, from lectures to syndicate working groups. The lectures were finished with a possibility to debate around the brought up issue. This created an environment for interaction between the audience and the lecturer, and since the gathering consisted of only 25-35 participants, it contributed to an easygoing ambiance in the room. Dr Magnus Norell put focus on the postmodern conflict threats occurring in mission areas, where using a gender perspective is as far as rocket science can be. When observing women as non-actors is not only excluding them from the peace process but also creating a threat as we have failed to see female insurgents several times throughout history.

Many fruitful discussions were held and conclusions were drawn, encouraging the visitors to enhance their ability to implement a gender perspective in their daily work as well as in the planning process.

Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM)

NCGM will carry on the work with implementing a gender perspective, UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions throughout their work. This includes an enhanced cooperation with NATO and other actors in order to develop a comprehensive education and training concept regarding gender dimensions in a military and security context. Additionally NCGM will continue to organize seminars and workshops with the intention of improving the knowledge and implementation at tactical, operational and strategic levels. The next upcoming event will be the Commanding Officers Gender Seminar in December 2012. ■

Above Kandak OMLT Training Event 12-01: Implementation of the Security Assistance Advisor Team Concept Already in Progress

Brigadier General Jaromír Zůna,
JFTC Chief of Staff

Advisory teams (AT) are considered to be one of the most valuable contribution of the nations to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development and professionalization within the transition process. Advisory teams also represent a visible assurance of the continuous support which the NATO member states and the partner nations continue to provide for the ANSF to facilitate its buildup and ever growing responsibilities for the security roles. In that context, from 16 to 29 March 2012, the JFTC in Bydgoszcz conducted its ninth Above Kandak OMLT Training Event 12-01 (AK OMLT TE 12-01). It is important to mention, that it was the last AK OMLT training conducted in the current format, before transition to the new "Security Force Assistance Advisor Team Concept of Operations" (SFA) which was adopted by NATO in February 2012. Specificity of the AK OMLT TE 12-01 rests in the fact, that the new SFA concept has already been partially reflected in the exercise curriculum. That was one of the reasons why the training event attracted so much attention among the senior military leadership, especially those who are preparing for deployment to the ISAF mission in the near future.

The training audience for AK OMLT TE 12-01 consisted of 11 teams - 2 Corps OMLTs, 6 Brigade OMLTs and 3 Garrison Support Unit (GSU) OMLTs. Altogether there were 119 military personnel from 12 nations. Composition of the Exercise Control (EXCON) reflected the complexity of the training event. Besides many others, it included 51 Instructors and Subject Matter Experts (SME), 42 members of the ANSF and 35 interpreters. During the culmination of the training event the EXCON's size reached 200 personnel. Also, the JFTC received a great deal of support from the NCSA, NCSA SQN Bydgoszcz and the JFTC Support Unit Bydgoszcz. Their direct support is indispensable for any training event held at the JFTC, but with large exercises their support is essential to the success of the training. What we also see as an invaluable contribution to the quality of the training and overall success of the AK OMLT TE 12-01 with active participation of the observers and guests. Not only were they observing the training as such. They were rather directly involved in discussions with the OMLT teams, ANSF partners and also sharing their own experience with the JFTC staff from pre-deployment training and previous service in ISAF. It is enough to mention the list of official guests: LTG Atanas SEMANDOV (COM JFC, Bulgarian Armed Forces), LTG James L. TERRY (COM 5th Corps, U.S.) and BG Klaus VON HEIMENDAHL (D COM, 13th Infantry Division, Germany) to be able to fully appreciate the positive impact they made on the preparation of the OMLT teams and lasting positive impression they created among their members.

AK OMLT 12-01 was the last training event conducted in the current format. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned earlier, there was already a requirement to incorporate selected elements in the training of the new SFA Concept which is being implemented in ISAF. This concept will eventually introduce changes into the future Above Kandak MAT/ OCC (Military Advisory Team/OCC Advisory Team) training conducted at the JFTC, starting with the AK MAT/OCC 12-02 which is scheduled for July 2012. That was the challenge which the

training team had to encounter. Another one was posed by the character of the AK OMLT training which no one could avoid. Like in all previous training events, it was again a challenge to accommodate all the training requirements for the training audience which covers:

- three levels of command (Corps, Brigade, GSU),
- OCCs at Regional and Provisional level,
- the OMLTs which will be assigned to four ISAF Regional Commands (RC N, RC W, RC S, RC C),
- operating alongside two ANA Corps HQs, nine brigades and garrison support units of five different ANA Corpses,
- especially situations when activities of all these teams are not functionally connected.

In this setting, the exercise scenario, for example, had to be "good enough" for all the different OMLTs and enable them to establish a realistic framework for the whole training event and all the participating actors. The same considerations applied to every other element of the exercise, starting from the AK OMLT TE 12-01 Execution Plan, through CIS/ CAX Support and finishing with the Real Life Support. What allows the JFTC to manage all the variables emanating from the organization of the complex training event, such was the AK OMLT TE 12-01, is the experience it has gained since 2008 from the organization of the pre-deployment training for ISAF. Taking into account the fact that the centre is the only NATO institution responsible for AK OMLT training, its experience in this area is truly unique and invaluable. As concluded by the SMEs during the Post Exercise Discussion: "The Centre has a very modern and useful material base. The lectures are deep and complete, containing various information about the theatre, ISAF activities and the overall situation in Afghanistan. EXCON personnel are experienced and well prepared. Scenario situations are realistic and often met in the day-to-day life."

Above Kandak OMLT training concept at a glance

NATO sponsored AK OMLT training at the JFTC is the culminating event in the process of OMLTs' preparation for the ISAF mission. The training is based on the provision of realistic environment in terms of the scenario, knowledge, expertise, information, ANSF participation and availability of the C2/ FAS and CIS/ CAX systems. In order to secure the upward trend in the quality of the preparation of the AK OMLTs, proper attention is paid to identification of the training objectives.

The aim of the training can be expressed in just a few sentences. To train the OMLTs to interact, mentor, advise and train for Corps, Brigade and Garrison Support Units. Ensure common knowledge and expertise among the OMLTs across the theatre. And finally provide solid knowledge of the ANSF structure, doctrine and operational procedures. The purpose is to ensure the teams' ability to co-ordinate ANSF and ISAF operations through effective application of individual and collective knowledge, habits and acquirements obtained during the training. Individual skills emphasize instructional techniques, advisor specific skills, staff procedures, military decision making process, COIN and C-IED knowledge, language capability, effective use of interpreters, cross-cultural communication and others. Collective skills, on the other hand, focus on mission analyses, planning capabilities, assessment, assisting capabilities, etc. Individual as well as collective skills are key to successful execution of the AK OMLTs missions. To a large extent those requirements are individually set for each OMLT, because they differ in terms of the mission, level of command and type of the brigade they support.

Structure of the AK OMLT TE 12-01 was developed around the following fundamental training blocks: SME Preparation (3 days), MST – Mission Specific Training (3 days), FAT – Functional Area Training (2 days) and MRE – Mission Rehearsal Exercise (4 days), followed by EXDIR's AAR – After Action Review and CSR – Commander's Summary Review. The training also included a one day team building and professional development event. Before the training all the participants had to complete National training and as a prerequisite OMLT Joint Advanced Distributed Learning Course (JADL). 96% of the OMLT members were able to successfully complete ADL which greatly enhanced integration of individual teams and contributed to the quality of the training event. The rest were able to complete the JADL during the first days of the training. Completion of the JADL constituted an important precondition for attainment of the ambitious, but at the same time realistic training objectives. For the JFTC the completion rate also served as an indicator of how the training audience was prepared for the upcoming training event.

It must be remembered that the AK OMLTs are formed on ad-hoc basis, they are by nature multinational and they consist of personnel with various levels of experience and different military background. Therefore, the purpose of MST is to ensure that OMLT personnel posses a common knowledge and understanding of Afghanistan and OMLT mission related issues. Recognizing the importance of this phase for the overall success of the training there were 51 specific objectives identified just for the MST. Each of them aims at specific knowledge or skill-set from the following categories: Afghanistan, Regional Considerations, ISAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A, TF Phoenix, PRTs, RCs, ANA/OMLTs, other actors in the AOR, COIN, C-IED, Mentoring, Communication Skills and Academics. The phase sets the conditions for the whole training event. Apart from the theoretical knowledge and set of required skills the OMLT members gain understanding of roles and responsibilities of the individual's and the OMLTs and where they fit in the ISAF mission. They are becoming aware of what it means to work in a small team with HQ, units, and even individuals of the ANA in a COIN environment. Prevailing methods of instructions are lectures, case studies, syndicate works, panel table discussions and active mentoring by the SMEs and ANSF members. The MST phase consisted of 22 academic sessions, including five panel discussions. Above that, three VTC conferences were organized between the training audience and RC-N, RC-S and IJC.

Panel Discussions represented valuable training format for information exchange between the training audience, SMEs and mentors. For the team leaders

academic sessions provided an opportunity for observation whether the team members have a full understanding about the topics which were the subject of the discussions. All the lectures were greatly appreciated not only by the training audience, but also by the visitors and observers. LTG James L. Terry, for example, during the observation of the AK OMLT training at the JFTC, summarized the importance of the MST perfectly:"Academic part of the training is all about the context. If you do not know the context in Afghanistan you will make a wrong decision."

After successful completion of the conceptual preparation the OMLTs were transitioning to the FAT phase which was covering purely military mission related training. The aim of the FAT is to train the OMLT members in mission related doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (DTTP) specific to their functions. The OMLT members have to understand the in-theater military capabilities, Operational Planning, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, Air Operations, MEDEVAC and Medical Support, Indirect Fire Support, Logistics Operations, Convoy Operations, Reporting and others. Main focus was on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and how to mentor ANSF commanders and staffs in the use of MDMP. Members of the ANSF are extensively used in this phase of the training. Their role is to replicate real conditions in the theater. They form headquarters and staff elements used by the OMLTs as "a school aid" to learn

and improve their mentoring skills when executing MDMP or when advising ANSF on training related issues. The FAT is again executed through a variety of tutorial and training methods, but added focus is given to the vignette based training. Also in the FAT phase, additional 13 specific training objectives have been adopted. Achievement of these objectives constituted a prerequisite for successful execution of the main part of the training event – MRE.

All the elements of the AK OMLT TE 12-01 led up to the MRE, which was the focal point of the training event. During the MRE the OMLTs had to fully apply the mission related DTTP by conducting practical exercise with the ANSF. The OMLTs had to mentor the ANSF through planning and execution of Corps, Brigade and GSU level missions and demonstrate understanding of OMLT fundamentals. The OMLTs which will be operating in ISAF alongside Corps HQ and Brigades used simulations for execution of their plans against computer-generated opposition forces. They had to develop a brigade operational plan working in parallel with their ANSF counterparts. On the other hand, GSU OMLTs conducted during the MRE extended case studies. Primary focus of the MRE is interaction and mentoring. The achievement of the training objectives is therefore measured mainly by the level of understanding the process and mentoring skills, rather than the result of the simulations.

Learning from the experienced

The role of the SMEs cannot be omitted. Their role in training for ISAF is indispensable. They bring to the table the most recent information about the development in the theatre, new methods and procedures which have just recently been developed, and above all, they are a tremendous source of expertise. For the AK OMLT TE 12-01 the JFTC invited 51 SMEs from the NATO member states as well as from Afghanistan. Like any other training centre the JFTC has in its disposal a required set of the core military skills and expertise. But not all of which are necessary to train for the current complex operations. Thus, the main role of the SMEs is to complement the existing capabilities within the centre to be able to ensure the quality of the training conducted at the JFTC. The SMEs assisted the JFTC in the areas of COIN, Afghan Culture, Governance and Reconstruction, ISAF Intelligence, CIED, Logistics, MDMP, MEDEVAC, NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, Engineer, Medical, CASEVAC and Air Operations. For the SMEs the training event is always longer than for the training audience. They have to arrive a few days earlier in order to finalize with the JFTC training team all the necessary preparations for the training event. Over the years the JFTC has established close working relationship with a large number of experts who are always willing to participate in the training events when asked for their assistance. Such relationships also simplify mutual communication and especially flow of information and recommendations which are subsequently incorporated into the training.

Based on the constructive feedback from the SMEs participating in the previous AK OMLT training the JFTC introduced a special training block devoted to the Senior

NCOs Training. With the steadily growing ANSF's role in preservation of security in Afghanistan the OMLTs were observing the need for greater advisory role of the senior NCOs serving as OMLT members. Obviously, such a requirement had to be reflected in the content of the training. Incorporation of the Senior NCO Training provided an opportunity for NCOs to exchange their experience and best practices from the AK OMLT operations in ISAF. The topics for discussions, or vignettes during the MRE phase, made the senior NCOs better prepared for their advisory duties. They covered common themes of pre-deployment training, but also advisory techniques, expectations from a senior NATO NCO leader, information about ANSF professional NCO Corps development and others. In order to ensure the quality, the training was facilitated by the Senior NCO Instructor from NATO School in Oberammergau. Another recommendation made by the OMLTs in the theater was to expand the regional focus of the training. After arrival to ISAF, some OMLTs experienced a lack of specific information about the current situation in the region into which they deployed. They suggested that the common training program should be expanded with regional specific information (social, economic, security, military) in accordance with the planned deployment of individual teams. OMLT members are especially interested in information about the ANSF headquarters and units the teams will be operating with. These requirements were also addressed in the curriculum. Last but not least, with the aim to improve coordination throughout the training event between the EXCON and OMLTs the JFTC also introduced Exercise Control Teams which were assigned to each OMLT. These improvements represent only examples of a variety of other refinements the OMLT Training Team led by Col Ivan Pach is adopting for each cycle of the AK OMLT training. This approach ensures that the training of the AK OMLT teams is aligned with the development of the ISAF mission and is optimized to meet the requirements of the commanders in the field.

Post exercise discussion

Without post exercise discussion and identification of the lessons learned no exercise is complete. Director of the AK OMLT TE 12-01 Brigadier General Grzegorz Buszka chaired three separate sessions with the SMEs/ ANSF, training audience and the JFTC training team to capture the execution of the training from various points of view. There is no intent to flatter anybody, but in general, with every training event executed the JFTC is hearing more positive comments. The reason is obvious. The JFTC is a learning institution and gradually, with more exercises of the same type executed, it is constantly improving. Training programs are elaborated in greater details, content more relevant and phases of the training events thoroughly orchestrated. Common denominator of the post exercise discussions about AK OMLT TE 12-01 was the requirement to sustain the structure and methodology of the training which is unique and highly relevant. That is good news for the Alliance itself because the structure of the exercise was the translation of the relevant NATO training policies into a comprehensive training event. Motivated and experienced people, good training environment, CIS/ CAX technology available and exceptional comprehensive support ensure the rest. It all needs to function in an orchestrated fashion in order to meet one of the fundamental requirements of the training audience – "We deploy, and the next day, have to be able to operate. There is no transition period or, time to learn the hard way."

Highly regarded was the opportunity to train alongside with the Afghan partners, learn about their perspective and from their experience. The trainees also appreciated the VTC sessions which enabled them to receive the most recent information from the theatre and share experience with the OMLTs operating in Afghanistan. Leader of the ANSF BGEN Mohd Asrar Aqdas, on the other hand, was pleased with the intensity of the training and hard work displayed by the OMLT members. For consideration, he also recommended expansion of the future AK OMLT training with a two day practical exercise in the field, supported by units from the Polish Armed Forces.

All in all, from BGEN Aqdas' perspective, one of the preconditions for success of the AK OMLT TE 12-01 was the training plan developed by the JFTC, which was both realistic and of high quality.

There is always room for improvement. Unanimously SMEs, ANSF, and the training audience the most, all requesting more time and effort to be dedicated to the MDMP. In addition, they recommended a more structured, step by step approach, supported with more in depth lectures leaning on practical examples from the field. During the discussion, all agreed that the crux of the problem is in insufficient individual/ national phase of preparation before arrival to the JFTC. Only some of the OMLT members are aware of the gaps, or lack of practical experience, with execution of the MDMP. Nevertheless, the JFTC will have to address the requirements in the future AK OMLT training. Another suggestion was to include more CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation) related issues into the scenario, review the balance between the theoretical preparation and practical applications and request for more detailed information about the future role of the OCCs.

The value of the NATO centralized pre-deployment training

For teams, consisting of servicemen from various nations, the AK OMLT TE 12-01 was an exceptional training opportunity, during which the team members could meet each other, learn, and rehearse their mission prior to deployment. They received the latest information and expertise from the SMEs and facilitators, many of whom just recently returned from the ISAF mission. Also, interaction with the ANSF counterparts enhanced their situational awareness, knowledge as well as mentoring skills. Lastly, the training enabled the OMLT members to identify the gaps in their individual preparation. The training team and the SMEs provided them with recommendations about how to overcome the gaps in their preparation in the remaining time before deployment. Speaking about the takeaways from the training the JFTC training team recommended to the OMLT members to focus on the following issues:

- maintain connections with other members of the OMLT,
- make contact with the partner OMLT deployed in ISAF,
- stay close to the situation in Afghanistan,
- update your knowledge about SFA AT Concept,
- prepare for Phase III training after deployment,
- work on Dari & Pashtu phrases,
- provide the JFTC with feedback during and after deployment,
- plan to return to the JFTC as an SME to support future training events. ■

NATO Corner in the Kazimierz Wielki University

Dr. Kamila Sierzputowska,
Kazimierz Wielki University Institute of Political Science

NATO Corner, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Point was opened on 4 June 2012 at the Main Library of the Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz.

It was officially opened by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Radosław Sikorski, the Joint Force Training Centre Commander, Major General Pavel Macko, the Deputy Voivode, Mr Zbigniew Ostrowski and the University authorities.

This is the first initiative of this kind in Poland, meant to serve students, citizens of Bydgoszcz and all those who would like to broaden their knowledge about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"In the NATO Corner students of our University will find literature, multimedia and, above all, they will have direct connection to NATO web sites" – said the President of the University, Professor Józef Kubik.

Mr Radosław Sikorski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed that Bydgoszcz is still strengthening its position. "Due to the fact that the JFTC has been located here, Bydgoszcz is present on diplomatic maps of Europe and the world", he said. "I am very happy that the Kazimierz Wielki University puts so much importance to subjects related to security. I hope this NATO Corner will have its contribute and in the future Poles will occupy higher positions in NATO institutions." – added the minister.

The Corner was created as a result of cooperation between the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland and NATO Headquarters Library. To create the Corner, the University received six thousand euro of subsidy from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

Temporarily the NATO Corner is located in the University Main Library, however, as the President of the University announced, as soon as the new library building has been completed, the Corner will be moved to the new facility and enlarged.

The NATO Corner will contain, among others, a collection of books about history and current activities of the Alliance, about defense and national and international security in Polish and English and also information in a multimedia form prepared by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. It will

be supplemented by a selection of links to NATO websites.

University authorities emphasize that the NATO Corner will be especially useful for students and teachers of subjects like political science, international relationships, history and national security. It will be available to all the interested.

"Today we are opening another chapter of cooperation between NATO and Bydgoszcz. The NATO Corner will allow students and all those willing to find out more about the Alliance for direct connection with the NATO Library and access to many other sources (…). My congratulations to the University on being the first place in Poland that has such capabilities." – said general Macko. He also mentioned the Inspectorate for the Armed Forces Support and Military Aviation Plant nr 2 as well as NATO institutions – the JFTC, NCBY and the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence which is being created now. All those institutions emphasize the importance of the city of Bydgoszcz for the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Cooperation between the JFTC and the University started several years ago. Participation of the then Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Panos Mavropoulos, in the Greek Day, a part of the Science Days organized by the University was a real milestone. It was when, paraphrasing words of general Macko, the first chapter of the mutual cooperation between the University and the JFTC started.

One of the next steps was creating the International School of Bydgoszcz in March 2009 that was created mainly for children of the soldiers serving at the JFTC.

Another area of cooperation is lectures for a broad audience, devoted to selected issues related to national and international security and international relationships that was initiated in February 2012 with a lecture given by Brigadier General Jaromir Zůna, the JFTC Chief of Staff, in the Political Science Institute of the University. The University authorities hope that the cooperation that started so well will continue in other areas in the future and will strengthen the university's potential even more. Both sides will benefit from it.

The Kazimierz Wielki University is a full-profile university. It is a six-department university, Bydgoszcz's biggest, second (in terms of the number of professors, students and graduates) in the kujawsko-pomorskie region. In the region it also ranks second in terms of the offered subjects and forms of education.

The University offers bachelor's studies, supplementary master's studies, PhD studies as well as several dozen of different post-graduate studies. Altogether, there are 100 majors and specialties.

In 2011 there were fifteen thousand students, out of whom 33% were people from outside the kujawsko-pomorskie region. The staff consists of around 1200 university teachers, including 324 PhDs and 175 professors.

The University can grant the PhD title in ten subjects (literary studies, linguistics, pedagogy, psychology, history, political science, conducting, biology, mechanics, physics) and can also grant the postdoctoral degree in two subjects (pedagogy, history).

The UKW is the only university in the kujawsko-pomorskie region that teaches psychology and physical education and the only university in Europe teaching revitalization of water routes.

The University takes part in a number of research projects and cooperates with institutions in Poland and abroad (41 agreements with universities from 18 countries in 2010).

The UKW has been taking care of the Bydgoszcz Botanical Garden (arboretum) and a number of activities aimed at the local community, among others the Bydgoszcz Festival of Science, University Courses for Retirees, the Museum of Polish Diplomacy and Exile, the Word Ethics Association, Remembrance Routes and also many contests and open-air events.

UKW students are successful sportsmen. They are world champions – Paweł Wojciechowski – the in pole-vault and Piotr Siemianowski in canoeing, Poland and Europe champions – Marika Popowicz and Dariusz Kuś in sprint. The University paddlers are also successful; they have taken part in prestigious boat-race in Henley-on-Thames since 2008. ■

Security Threats in the Black Sea – Balkan Region

COL Georgi Dimov PhD,
Dean of National Security and Defense Faculty

Because of its geography the Black Sea – Balkan region is destined to be contested. This has been confirmed in history many times. The region is known as a powder-magazine of Europe and it does not enjoy a good reputation among other European nations. The region is famous for war criminals and ethnic conflicts during the wars in Western Balkans. The countries in the region suffered from loss of population, which emigrated because of high rate of unemployment and low standard of living. According to the Gallup survey, 42% of Albanians want to move to another country, likewise 34% of the Kosovars and 32% of the Macedonians.

Despite the above circumstances the Black Sea – Balkan region is of extremely important significance – from geo-political, economic, infrastructural, communicational point of view.

1. Geo-strategically, the Black Sea – Balkan region is located on the crossroads between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, which, along with its potential for development in trade and economics makes it vulnerable, concerning the contemporary risks and threats.

2. Regarding the security, a specific feature of the Black Sea is that there is no such legal notion as "open seas" in accordance with international maritime law, and it is treated as integrated territory of all littoral countries.

3. Over 50 000 ships from about 90 different countries annually sail across the Black Sea, and carry over 450 million ton of various cargo with increasing tendency of about 11% per year. More than 30 000 of these ships cross Bulgarian sea waters.

4. Black Sea – Balkan region is a world energy corridor – every day more than 3 million barrels or 400 000 ton of oil cross its waters, and over 30 tankers pass through the straits, thus ensuring 42% of the oil supply for the European Union.

5. The countries from the region (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan plus Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) are not homogenous in terms of democratic reforms and stability. Fundamental democratic values, such as the supremacy of law and good governance are not always observed to the required degree. Various regional and social misbalances, as well as ethnic and minority problems, continue to weaken the countries of the region. Their institutions are not stable enough due to corruption, organized crime, computer and intellectual piracy, money laundering and other negative phenomena with direct affect on the security environment – both at national and regional level.

6. Most countries of the region are integrated in the Euro-Atlantic, European and regional structures to a varying degree; this is also true in regards to the area of security.

7. The so called "frozen", or, in some cases "thawing", conflicts such as (Transnistria, Nagorni Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia) are a significant contributing factor with serious implications for the security in the region. The conflict in Georgia, in August 2008, and the following crisis in the relations between Russia and Georgia prove that such conflicts remain among major challenges and threats to the security of the region even today.

8. It has been recently identified that there are two basic circumstances for prosperity of the region – infrastructure projects and, especially, energy security.

As of today, the main factors that positively affect the security environment of the region, are NATO and the EU. NATO has two long-term allies (Turkey and Greece) and four relatively fresh members (Bulgaria and Romania as of 2004 and Albania and Croatia as of 2009) which prove that influence of Euro-Atlantic Council in the East is increasing. With the Bulgarian and Romanian EU membership the Black Sea has become a natural outer border of the union. This is an entirely new geopolitical factor, which forces the EU and NATO to deal more actively with the issues of security and cooperation in the region of the Black Sea and Balkans.

In this context, new and positive moments influencing the security environment are the developing (although ambiguously and irregularly) processes of democratization in the remaining countries of the region and the readiness declared by them to

join the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Ambassador Necip Egüz, as a prominent Turkish diplomat observed that 'having reforms on paper does not however mean that they are fully grounded in every day society. Implementation takes time, patience, training, education and a new philosophy and angle by which to approach the future'.

The importance of issues linked to energy security has already been pointed as a qualitatively new factor for regional and European security. This could contribute to growing social and economic cohesion and to strengthening cultural connections. Cooperation in the framework of Euro-regions means looking for comprehensive solutions to solve local communities' problems. An individual country cannot solve its energy problems alone and in Bulgaria it has recently been proved with nuclear power plant project "Belene" and the gas pipeline "South Stream".

The process of cooperation is useful also from the perspective of avoiding creation of new lines of political division as a complementary instrument besides other traditional international contacts. In fact, while discussing the status of Kosovo, for example politicians agreed to exclude the idea of ethnic based partition as a possibility. Bulgarian experience shows that multi-ethnic societies are a good formula for the Balkan region. Regional stability process does not favor partition, either, because of the borders change of the province which could give a motive for redrawing borders especially in former Yugoslavia.

A lot of experts think that the security environment of the Black Sea – Balkan region is directly subjected to the strategic balance between Russia and NATO in their efforts to promote their competitive interests within the region. Both sides increase tension connected with Missile Defense Shield elements in Southeast Europe. Because of that, in Chicago summit next month there will not be session of the NATO – Russia council.

The next largest strategic factor in the region – Turkey remains in a position of Euro-Atlantic identity and its EU aspirations. The last one is somehow controversial having in mind Turkish affinity towards classical nationalism – imperial patterns of behavior in the region of the Black Sea and Balkans due to its history.

The security environment in the Black Sea – Balkan region as a whole can be characterized as being of the low risk with various irregular threats. Military options for pursuing strategic interests remain possible, but only through limited and low intensity operations. No single factor in the region could afford massive and protracted campaign, capable of extending hostilities beyond restricted sub-regional spots. This assessment is unanimously shared by the countries, but this should not cancel the necessity of still more active, adequate efforts for enhancing stability and development of cooperation in the region. The security environment in the region is unstable according to the Western standards of security in Europe.

Traditionally, influence of the existing negative factors is amplified by newly emerging serious risks and threats, which must not be ignored because of their interconnections and dynamics. New moments that emerge all the time call for new approaches in the fight against the, so called, asymmetric threats (terrorism, transnational organized crime, illegal migration, human trafficking, weapons and drugs, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and commodities with a dual usage, intellectual, communication and information piracy, smuggling channels, transnational pollution of the environment, money laundering, etc.).

I would like to refocus your attention a little bit, because most of the countries in the Black sea – Balkan region are classified as former authoritarian regimes on their way to democracy. So we can draw some conclusions from the ongoing turbulence in Arab world which are valuable for our region.

We witness dramatic changes in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Morocco and some other Arab countries. The changes were spread by Internet societies in the states with long lasting regimes. This example shows that the information technologies become a powerful tool overwhelming even armies in case of security system transformation and democratization. It is an irregular way of organizing national powers for resistance and because of that it is a source of non-traditional threats to others.

Studying real events we face the question on how to meet the common non-traditional security challenges and maintain regional peace and stability. Today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all, especially in regional dimensions.

In general, history tells us that all the countries have to depend on themselves for protecting their national security. The new regional conditions and particularly non-traditional threats emphasize much more on others for protecting national security. So the countries can depend on themselves and at the same time on others, for safeguarding national security and maintaining regional peace and stability. The most important principle is to strengthen unity while the unity relies on value exchange, dialogue and mutual understanding. Such exchanges are not only conducive to promote mutual understanding, but also to build trust and minimize misunderstanding. The new NATO initiative "Smart Defense" can be executed within such conditions.

Considering the region's potential as a transit route for non-traditional threats the strategy focuses on security issues, including maritime surveillance and border security of all the Black Sea – Balkan countries. We need to be effective in confronting threats with international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken. Key players in the region, such as NATO, EU and the World Trade Organization, have extended their membership. Russia and Turkey negotiate more flexibly. It gives a good perspective for solving the problems in countries, which are crossing point of their interests.

Many non-transnational threats are interrelated. Although some are politically motivated, terrorist and/ or insurgent groups often provide armed protection to drug operators in exchange for money or arms. Conversely, organized crime groups and drug traffickers commit terrorist acts that target government agencies and personnel who attempt to bring them to justice. These activities also rely on underground networks that operate across the frontiers of several states. Additionally, these operations violate international laws. The point is that these actors threaten public order, undermine the rule of law, and disrupt good governance.

Non-transnational threats are growing because of current regional conditions which are good for them. In many formerly authoritarian states in our region, there has been a long tradition of using violence, and numerous forms of corruption to resolve disputes in society. Many of the emerging democracies

continue to be plagued with factional loyalties that take advantage over the commitment to public policies, and indeed the constitution.

In this setting, criminal elements are able to absorb government officials through bribery or threats of violence. In effect, these criminal groups become a "shadow" government as is the case in some sub-regions, for example in some former Soviet and Yugoslavian republics. Organized criminals and terrorists do no limit their activities only to the territories of their home states but they have increasingly extended their influence into other states' jurisdictions, while simultaneously hiding behind the sovereignty of their home states. While they pose a threat to the regional system, these groups have been difficult to target because of the customary international legal premise of non interference in the internal affairs of states.

The new challenge now is to identify and evaluate old and new non-traditional dangers and adjust national security policy to address them. Non-traditional security issues may be subcategorized as ones that pose a longer term danger, and those that pose an imminent danger. Longer term dangers are those with effects that are currently less obvious. Consequently, fewer resources have been dedicated to understanding and countering them. They are, nonetheless, increasing and pose a distinct danger to global security, not only regional. These threats include environmental degradation, cyber-manipulation, smuggling of WMD, regional contamination and health issues, smuggling endangered flora and fauna.

Immediate and more visible dangers include terrorism, transnational organized crime, and drug and arms trafficking. Seeking for weakened and failing governments, organized crime and terrorist groups easily disappear from laws, slowly devastating their host states.

All these dangers are fully valid for our region and it doesn't matter which country you analyze – a NATO/ non-NATO member, an EU/ NON-EU member. The differences are in the means and ways of neutralizing each of non-traditional threats and organizations which can be involved. Each state in the Black Sea – Balkan region has got a lot of sources of danger which can be used to threat others. Regional conditions of power transition and weak state authorities amplify effects of threat transition.

To summarize, while studying non-traditional security issues, we have to pay attention to the following points:

1. Compared with traditional security, non-traditional security is diversified, complicated and unpredictable.
2. In safeguarding national security, we cannot attend to non-traditional security challenges and threats while neglecting traditional security challenges and threats;
3. Many non-traditional security issues are transnational; they not only threaten national security, but also threaten individuals, organizations and regions. So no country alone can handle such threats. It requires joint efforts of international community with extensive cooperation between countries. The most important in our case is to find out the solutions within the EU;
4. Military will continue to play a role in settling, both, non-traditional and non-traditional security issues.

In the world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger national society, well functioning institutions and a rule-based regional order should be objective for all. Market economies with heavy hand of government, is the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. So it is not good for Black sea – Balkan region to be perceived as a European border, because if there is a border then there will always be non-traditional security problems.

As a member of the EU, Bulgaria proposes that the EU adopts a more committed and active position on all security issues in the Black Sea – Balkan region.

Among the most important and working regional mechanisms, initiatives and organizations are the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation; the Process of Cooperation in South – East Europe; the Process of Meetings of the Defense Ministers of South – East Europe; the Measures for Stabilizing the Trust and Security in the Navy of the Black Sea Region; the Operational Group for Naval Cooperation in the Black Sea Region; The Agreement for Cooperation between the Coastal/ Border Security Services and its basic form - the International Black Sea Border Information and Coordination Center which works in Bourgas is Bulgaria's national contribution to the stabilization and security in the Black Sea region.

A review of the existing mechanisms for regional cooperation in the sphere of defense was performed and the priorities in the activities of the already existing Council for regional cooperation in the same sphere were pointed out. Bulgaria continues to participate in the debate among the countries of the Multinational Peace Forces for South – East Europe concerning the parameters of the future missions of the South – East Europe Brigade.

Not only will all these mechanisms and initiatives promote our mutual understanding and trust, but also could be used for reference in our practice of administrating countries and military forces and maintaining regional and world peace.

For the powerful European states thinking that they can barricade themselves and use neighbouring countries and regions for protection is unrealistic. Non-traditional threats are product of different exchanges of goods, resources, knowledge, people, cultures and etc. That is why there is a need to focus on the root that causes threats which can penetrate easily, particularly in regions like ours, with mixture of different religions and cultures. Hence, political dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts become essential tools for reduction of tensions. Only win-win strategy can work here.

Military power needs to be used with caution. It may temporarily deal with immediate problems, but can seriously worsen it, politically thus generating long term negative effects.

At the economic level, countries–members of the EU in the Black Sea – Balkan region, like Bulgaria, should not feel marginalized. In this regard, the problem of marginalization of groups within states and of states within region needs to be addressed appropriately.

In conclusion, it has to be underlined that deepening cooperation among the countries in our region can be fostered by closer relations with the EU which can be, and will hopefully be, particularly powerful in addressing domestic security challenges, as well as most of the trans-national challenges. ■

"I know that in the age of austerity, we cannot spend more. But neither should we spend less. So the answer is to spend better... This means we must prioritise, we must specialise, and we must seek multinational solutions through cooperation".

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen (30 SEPT 2011)

The NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence - On the Way Towards NATO MP Full Interoperability

COL Grzegorz Wasilewski,
Chief of the MP COE Establishment Team

NATO forces operating in various places of the world have to counter asymmetric threats, including criminal activities. Military Police, being a part of the forces, have to meet new requirements, e.g. prevent hostile actions and react appropriately in case they occur, carry out investigation or purse perpetrators. In response to these challenges, Military Police formations of most NATO member states have developed their own national procedures and standards. However, to ensure the highest possible level of interoperability in a multinational environment of operations, there is a need to work out procedures and doctrines which would be common for all NATO MP and which would clearly define Alliance's common goal in the theatre. In this context the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence (the NATO MP COE) would be the key instrument to effectively integrate the all MP forces, with the highest degree of interoperability.

As countries need to cut off their spending but at the same time keep up with the priorities set up by the decisions makers, NATO proposed to involve in Centres of Excellence which allow for better spending, ensuring the same level of priorities and specialization. The Centres, being multinational in their nature, ensure cooperation at the best possible level.

By the definition a **COE** is a nationally or multinationally sponsored entity, which offers recognized expertise and experience to the benefit of the Alliance, especially in support of transformation. It provides opportunities to enhance education and training, to improve interoperability and capabilities, to assist in doctrine development and/or to test and validate concepts through experimentation. This definition clearly states the COE is neither an HQ, command nor a unit. It is not even a typical training centre although it can provide courses and trainings. Nevertheless, I would like to pay attention to the fact that COEs, including the NATO MP COE, are not a part of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and they are not within national chain of command. Having a status of an independent International Military Organization (IMO), the COE is not under any pressure from external entities. A Steering Committee, a COE`s decision taking body consisting of nation`s representatives, plays a leading role and constitutes a kind of shield against external pressure. Therefore, the COE is neither externally not nationally restricted in terms of contacts with academia, industry and GOs and NGOs.

The future NATO MP COE will provide the lead subject matter expertise for the development of MP standards and capabilities. In this way the Centre will support cooperation and interoperability of both NATO and Partner Nations. The NATO MP COE, as a single location for SMEs working for the benefits of NATO and Partner Nations, would ensure a coherent and joint approach for all Nations in a given subject matter based on contributions from all stakeholders. This will include cooperation between Nations and organisations through sharing information and development concerning MP related activities and events.

The multinational cooperation is the key factor not only within functioning COE,

NATO Centre of Excellence (Source: Transformation Network Branch / ACT)

but it is vital in the process of establishing the Centre as well. The best example of mutual cooperation was the 1st Memorandum of Understanding Conference for the establishment of the NATO MP COE held in April 2012, at the premises of the Joint Force Training Centre (Bydgoszcz, Poland). It was agreed that the 1st MOU Conference was a success since it attracted the interest and participation of 15 NATO Nations. Even during the Conference, substantial progress was registered in terms of the NATO MP COE development and way ahead. During the Conference the basic documents and ideas were discussed and amended to reflect the views of all the delegates.

One of the main results of the Conference was the development of the mission of the NATO MP COE. That will include **enhancing NATO MP capabilities, fostering interoperability, and providing subject matter expertise on MP activities in order to meet the Alliance's strategic concept.** The NATO MP COE will focus but not limit its activities on the cooperative aspects of MP in support of the Strategic Concept current and future operations in the following core areas:

a. Doctrine and Concept Development:

– supporting national and multinational efforts in developing doctrines, publications, standards, procedures and other documents in order to facilitate common understanding in fulfilling MP activities in every operational environment,

– supporting and contributing to the development and validation of NATO and national policies, doctrines and concepts which require MP expertise.

b. Education and Training:

– providing education and training onsite at the NATO MP COE,

– providing instructors and mobile education and training teams (METT),

– developing and delivering courses, workshops, seminars, supporting MP NATO's operations and training,

– proposing courses for NATO accreditation.

c. Research and Development:

– researching methodologies within national, Alliance's and Partner institutions responsible for transformation of their Armed Forces, especially within the military and civilian police activities,

– formulating, experimenting, reviewing and recommending new concepts and directions for utilizing within MP multinational operational environment.

d. Analysis and Lessons Learned:

– gathering information to lessons identified and lessons learned from national, Alliance's and Partner military and civilian police institutions,

– analyzing and studying lessons identified, lessons learned and best practices,

– disseminating, sharing and publishing lessons learned,

– ensuring lessons identified, lessons learned and best practices are incorporated into the NATO MP COE curriculum,

– working in close cooperation with the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC),

– acting as a repository for lessons learned and best practices in multinational operations.

e. Consultation:

– serving as a platform for consultations, experiences and information exchange, discussion and meetings,

– acting as a conduit between NATO, Nations, industry, academia, GO, NGO, IO and other MP-related stakeholders,

– advising national as well as international stakeholders on the MP-related issues to be addressed in their doctrine, standards, and

procedures.

The main asset of the NATO MP COE will be its multinationality, bringing many benefits either in terms of daily duty routine or social life. Military Police education and training, analysis and lessons learned, concept development and experimentation, doctrine development and standards will be developed and delivered in a truly multinational environment. A similar, if not greater, multinational environment exists in real life operations. Moreover, this allows for faster delivery and sharing of ideas or/and products and best practices and as well as incorporation of inputs from Nations into all products. On the other hand, by sending staff to the NATO MP COE the Nations will be able to properly react to emerging requirements and send requests with relatively quick turnover from the COE. It will save time by excluding the need to find an external expert every time one wants to share, discuss or test an idea or issue – there will be almost 40 Subject Matter Experts in the MP field, ready to provide assistance and advice. And finally, where if not here within the NATO MP COE, can we rapidly build interoperability within MP family?

The NATO MP COE will be a multinational joint military organisation, which, subject to decisions of the NAC, will hold the status of an International Military Organization pursuant to the Paris Protocol. Until activation of the NATO MP COE as a NATO military body and granting the status as an IMO, the Framework Nation (Poland) will act for the NATO MP COE and coordinate the interests of the Sponsoring Nations (SNs). During this period the other SNs will attach their national elements to the NATO MP COE in accordance with applicable international and national laws, including the NATO SOFA. Funding and manning will be provided by Poland and the SNs and will not depend on NATO common funding or NATO PE. The NATO MP COE will be staffed by multinational joint personnel from the FN, the SNs and Contributing Partners. The initial organizational chart is presented below.



The initial NATO MP COE organizational structure

The Director, appointed by the FN, will lead the NATO MP COE and staff, consisting of multinational personnel. As you can see, only the COE director, his group and Admin and Support Branch are allocated to Polish personnel. Other bids in the manning will be opened for Sponsoring Nations and for the key personnel subject to rotation between nations. There is the deputy – who will coordinate three specialized branches of doctrine and concept development, education and training and last, but not least a lessons learned branch. In total, there will be up to 40 joint multinational personnel there.

The NATO MP COE will not operate in environmental and expertise vacuum. The intention is to establish bilateral internal and external links between the Centre and military and civilian entities. A close cooperation with Academia, schools and training centers is expected. The Centre will closely cooperate with the national Doctrine and Training Centre in Bydgoszcz and practical/training events will be conducted at Polish MoD`s training areas, especially those belonging to the Polish Military Police.

Within the NATO COEs Network, the NATO MP COE will be unique since its business model will ensure that there is an adequate representation and/or support from Industry, Academia and other organizations, either GOs or NGOs. This may include any number of initiatives including partnerships, liaison staff endowments, and sharing equipment and facilities.

We can foresee a mutual cooperation with the UN or EU as those organizations often employ police/gendarmerie forces in different peacekeeping operations. This will be done in agreement with SN framework under SC decisions. The SMEs working for single COEs facilitate constant exchange and dissemination of information within and beyond the network of COEs coordinated by SACT. SACT's subordinate entities will

participate in this network as well as in other networks, which include specialists or subject matter experts. A close relationship between the COE and the appropriate agencies, schools of non-NATO countries and external entities is highly desirable in order to avoid duplication of effort and to fully profit from the synergy that can be reached by working in close harmony.



The NATO MP COE`s external relationships.

All the above is true but the NATO MP COE will not function properly without appropriate relationships with two MP family bodies, i.e. MP Chiefs Conference and MP Panel. They will play a leading role in creating a list of priorities for the MP COE and will ensure that there is an adequate Program of Work to cover NATO MP short and long-term requirements. I would even risk defining the role of the NATO MP COE towards these two bodies as think-tank quick reaction force by providing SMEs support almost on-hand.

The NATO MP COE, apart from building MP capability, will be an intellectual platform for the management of subject matter knowledge and expertise. At the same time the Centre will support NATO capability development, offering recognized education and training, expertise, analyses, researches and lessons learned. Therefore, the NATO MP COE as such should be perceived as a part of NATO intellectual platform, the aim of which is to support transformation within the interoperability niche – the NATO MP.

The NATO MP COE will be able to ensure a coherent joint approach for all Nations in a given subject matter but – and that is worth stressing – based on contributions from all participants. In that case we should focus not only on NATO but rather go one step further and build a bridge for police or gendarmerie formations of the UE member states, i.e. conceptual or doctrinal bridges that would allow them to work along with NATO forces in any operations. Obviously, at the same time, thanks to the NATO MP COE there is a significant chance to avoid duplication in NATO MPs capability development.

To sum up, let me stress one important thing: without any doubts there is a niche in NATO transformation network where NATO MPs are hiding with a challenging need to be interoperable. Poland has offered this COE for benefits to the NATO MP family but to NATO itself as well. And we would like to reach the FOC by the end of 2014.

Further information and news on the NATO MP COE development are available at www.mpcoe.wp.mil.pl ■

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Education in Bulgarian Armed Forces in Support of Security System

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In every law-governed state, crisis management is one of the key elements of its national security and by rule includes different activities of competent authorities aimed at avoiding occurrence and aggravation of crisis and their proper management. Crisis management differs from country to country and requires development and functioning of a National Crisis Management System (NCMS).

Not only does the effective establishment and functioning of NCMS requires well trained managerial, expert and operational personnel but also preparing the population to react to different crises. The preparation is carried out within the country's educational system and professional training centers at ministries and other executive central bodies. The military education system in the Bulgarian Armed Forces plays an important role in educating and training such personnel.

The end of the Cold War created new national security environment and the military education system of the Bulgarian Armed Forces was successfully transformed and accredited itself under the regulations of the Higher Education Act, Academic Degrees and Ranks Act and Professional Education and Training Act. As a result, it currently trains professionals for the Armed Forces as well as for other national security institutions and defense system including the NCMS.

The purpose of this article is to present the structure, organization and role of the military education system of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in education and training of staff for the NCMS.

Regulations for the national crisis management system are settled by the legislation of the Republic of Bulgaria, including Law on Defense and Armed Forces and Disaster Relief Act. These two acts include views used in the development and functioning of the crisis response system of NATO and the EU and of other organizations and countries with which the Republic of Bulgaria has international agreements. Following this approach means that Bulgaria considers co-operation with other countries as very important for the effective prevention and management of crisis.

In line with the regulations of the above mentioned laws, the National Crisis Management System settles the activities for prevention and management of crisis on the territory of the country and abroad – in the execution of obligations concerning international treaties of the Republic of Bulgaria. It is built on national and regional levels and includes crisis management bodies, crisis management centers, communication-information system and crisis response units.

National legislation states that main responsibilities in the national crisis management system are assigned to institutions governing the security system and first and foremost to central and regional executive bodies.

The Council of Ministers is the main state authority in charge of the general crisis management process, forms national policy and heads the NCMS. It is assisted by the Security Council and National Crisis Management HQ, formed for each particular event. The National Crisis Management HQ includes ministers, deputy ministers and leaders of other agencies of the executive power. Additionally at institutional and regional levels there are security and crisis management councils which ensure effective functioning of the national crisis management system.

Permanent crisis management centers created at the Council of Ministers, ministries and other bodies of the central executive

power, province governors and mayors are an essential part of the NCMS.

An inseparable part of the NCMS is the communication information system and crisis response forces created according to the Disaster Relief Act at the central and regional bodies of the executive power, medical emergency teams, other healthcare institutions, and volunteer organizations. The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Health play a key role in the establishment of crisis response forces.

As it was mentioned earlier, the military education system within the Bulgarian Armed Forces plays an important role in the education and training of managerial and expert personnel of the national crisis management system.

The military educational system of the Bulgarian Armed Forces includes Rakovski National Defense Academy, the National Military University and the Naval Academy. In terms of structure they include faculties, institutes, departments and colleges.

All training institutions of the Military Educational System are accredited to issue diplomas of university education in line with the national and European requirements. This accreditation results from the fact that the institutions have the habilitated and non-habilitated military and non-military teachers required by the Higher Education Act. Maintenance of such training staff is an extremely challenging task having in mind the necessity for meeting the requirements of both the national legislation and the regulations of the EU and NATO concerning higher education and professional military training.

The key success of the military educational system of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is the acknowledgement of the military theory as a science belonging to social sciences unlike in other European countries. As a result, the list of scientific fields in the Republic of Bulgaria includes military sciences under which teachers can acquire academic degrees and ranks.

The faculties of Rakovski National Defense Academy, National Military University and Naval Academy provide individual education and training of cadets, officers and civilians for acquiring professional qualifications and bachelor's and master's degrees under accredited military and civil disciplines according to the Higher Education Act. They also enable acquisition of PhD degree under accredited scientific disciplines in line with the Law for the Development of Academic Personnel. In addition Rakovski National Defense Academy, National Military University and Naval Academy provide post-graduate professional, specialized and language training military and civilian personnel.

Education and training in the military education system of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is carried out in three levels – tactical, operational and strategic. Additional qualifications are acquired between each level depending on the position requirements.

The education and training at tactical level is provided by the National Military University and Naval Academy for acquiring bachelor's degree in military and civil disciplines. During the training process the students also gain knowledge on crisis management issues and protection of the population in case of disasters, calamities and catastrophes. Finishing the training, successful graduates can find jobs in the Armed Forces or in other institutions of the security and defense system. The National Military University and the Naval Academy provide also bachelor's and master's degrees to civilian students in non-military disciplines including training in crisis management and protection of the population in case of disasters, calamities and catastrophes.

Education and training for the master's degree is provided by the Command and Staff Faculty of Rakovski National Defense Academy in five military disciplines for officers holding the army rank of captain and planned to be promoted. During the training officers study issues concerning national and international security, management of crisis of different origins and protection of the population in case of disasters, calamities and catastrophes. The faculty also provides master's studies for civil students in three civilian disciplines from the area of national security which comprises detailed study of different aspects of the national crisis management system.

Strategic level education and training is conducted at the National Security and Defense Faculty of the Rakovski National Defense Academy. Students will be able to obtain master's degree in a military discipline known as "Strategic Management of Defense and the Armed Forces". Officers with the rank of at least lieutenant colonel who are envisaged to be promoted are the primary training audience. The education of civilian students is also conducted in this faculty for acquiring master's degree in three non-military disciplines of National Security as well as many post-graduate courses for military officers and civil servants positioned at different expert and governing posts in the security and defense system of the country. The issues of analyzing, formulating, and conducting the national security and defense policy of the country as well as crisis management are main areas of studies. Trainees are conducting exercises and simulations during which they form crisis management teams and react to various crises using different decision making models.

Nowadays, the main task of the National Security and Defense faculty, defined by a clear public procurement order, is to prepare military and civilian leaders able to be modern strategic heads and commanders, capable of using contemporary strategic and operational concepts, and who are effective under the circumstances of democratic control and visibility. Such leaders should understand their unique mission and subordinate their ego to high goals of national security and present and future development of the Armed Forces. Therefore, the programs and the whole activity of the National Security and Defense Faculty are guided by understanding the notion of the difference between military and non-military expertise is permanently decreasing and every differentiation at the level of knowledge would be a step back.

Educational programs integrate different subjects and reflect a 10-year perspective in the security and defense system of the country. The programs focus on the following disciplines "National and International Security", "Security and Crisis Management Systems", "Military Strategy", "Operational Art", "Management of Defense and the Armed Forces" and "Strategic Leadership".

Education in the National Security and Defense Faculty emphasize critical thinking of the students in order to prepare future leaders of security and defense system to be able to work under conditions of high unpredictability, dynamics and complexity. Educational forms leading to constructive

and critical thinking are a big challenge both to teachers and students, who should not only learn by heart the documents but rather analyze them and create new papers. The aim of this education is to fill the gap between civilian and military expertise in all structures where political decisions concerning security, defense and crisis management are made.

Education in National Security and Defense Faculty is supported by active public and international activities. The faculty organizes and hosts a number of international and national conferences directly related to the educational content and research. Attendance of our teachers and scientists in the initiatives of civil society and academic circles in Bulgaria, as well as in the media is a noticeable and important contribution to a competent debate on national security, defense and crisis management issues.

As it was mentioned earlier, there is a possibility in the military educational system of the Bulgarian Armed Forces to acquire PhD in the areas of mathematics, technical, social and military science in accordance with the High Education Act and the Law for the Development of the Academic Personnel. The education and research for attainment of scientific degrees and ranks include acquiring knowledge and carrying out research on the issues of crisis management, because in the present environment, military science becomes an important factor determining not only successful war fighting but effectiveness of the comprehensive military and non-military activities for ensuring national security. This is predetermined due to the fact that the dialectics of the contemporary development integrates military aspects of the national security, prevention of possible war, keeping peace, readiness of the country for defense and decisive repulse of the aggressor in case of an armed conflict within one system. From this point of view the scope and the tasks of the military science are enlarged.

Nowadays, military science concentrates on studying different models of military activities, systemizing objective laws and principles for preparation of the country and its armed forces, prognosis of character, methods, forms and resources for war fighting, determining the ways for using military resources for prevention of possible armed conflict, determining possibilities and ways to apply military resources for dealing with non-military crisis and protection of population in case of disasters, calamities and catastrophes.

In Bulgaria, military science is considered as a general theory consisting of different elements. The general theory studies and develops the subject, the content and the functions of the military science as a whole, its internal and external relations, forms the methodology for military-scientific researches. It also studies and shows objective laws, processes and ways of implementing military activities in general. Elements study and reveal different sides, areas and processes of the military science. In these elements military knowledge from other scientific areas is enlightened.

Structural elements of the military science and its main scientific fields are: organization and control of the Armed Forces, political-military problems of the security, military-applied aspects of the civil protection.

Organization and control of the Armed Forces encompasses issues from theory of the military art, development of the Armed Forces; theory of the armaments, history of the military art, theory of the military education and training. These issues are directly related to the military art and formulate it to a great extent.

Political-military problems of the security are such an element that studies and develops topical problems of providing military security of the country and its preparation for defense. This element integrates the following theoretical areas: policy for military security (military policy), defense planning, strategic leadership of the defense, military aspects of the integration of the country in international security structures, genesis of the political-military crisis and military conflicts, risks for the military security, civil control over the Armed Forces; military-educational and personnel policy.

The military-applied aspects of the civil protection is a theoretical area, which deals with methods of protection of the population and different entities in the country in case of military conflicts or non-military crisis or in case of disasters, calamities and catastrophes, as well as the use of military formations for these purposes. Theoretical lines in this element vary a lot and widely cover other scientific areas. Most important of them are: protection of population against different threats; evacuation of the population, environmental disasters, protection of the critical infrastructure, keeping constitutional order and security of the citizens, liquidation of consequences of disasters, calamities and catastrophes.

Analysis of the content of the military science shows that it develops not only the theory of war fighting but the theory of crisis management and the military art in operations other than war, as well. As a result, it is clear that the new methods and forms of using the Armed Forces are incompatible with many of the objective laws and principles of conducting battle operations. This problem has led to creation of a package of knowledge and then a separate scientific line of using the Armed Forces in operations other than war under the scientific specialty organization and control of the Armed Forces.

Under the present circumstances it is most important for the military science to develop itself together with the military practice. This will ensure constructive interaction between them and balance of the efforts to provide national security to the country. This unity is an indicator of the acquired level of readiness of the Armed Forces and the other elements of the security and defense system of the country for neutralizing future risks and threats for the national security.

In conclusion, we should underline that all the efforts of the Military Educational System of the Bulgarian Armed Forces are one of the main factors for training of military and civilian personnel on the issues of crisis management.

The Military Educational System of the Bulgarian Armed Forces has the ambition to maintain the quality of the education and research activity at the level of contemporary requirements and future demands of the national security and defense systems of the country. The academic community in the military educational institutions strives to make the development of the Military Educational System a priority in the activity of the Ministry of Defense in order to successfully implement the task to prepare military and civilian specialists for the security and defense system of the country including the National crisis management system. ■

Experience from OMLT/POMLT In-theater Training

LTC Ladislav ZAKUŤANSKÝ,
DCOS Training Command-Military Academy in Vyskov

Afghan National Security Forces Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) plays a leading role in planning, coordination and assessment of the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). As a part of its mission, the ADAB is also responsible for the in-theatre training and validation of all NATO Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (POMLT). OMLT/ POMLT are considered to be one of the most valuable contributions of the sending states to the multinational effort which aims at the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) towards becoming a professional force, capable of taking over its nation's security. Such paramount role obviously requires our constant attention and support. It is, therefore, only natural that the forms of NATO´s potential future commitment into further development of the ANSF are subject to intensive discussions.

I have just recently returned from my tour in ISAF. I was among those, who had a privilege to contribute personally to the development of the ANSF. During my tour I was assigned to the IJC OMLT/ POMLT Division which enabled me to gain significant experience from the OMLT/ POMLT operations. Together with other colleagues from the division our primary duties covered two major parts. First, implementation of the 3rd Phase In-theatre OMLT/ POMLT Mission Specific Training (MST), called the Induction Course (IC). Second, I was also responsible for carrying out validation or periodic assessment of OMLT/ POMLT status of preparation and their performance. These functions were not limited to a specific region or training facility, but were carried out on the entire territory of Afghanistan. Considering the fact, that not that many coalition soldiers had an opportunity to be so intimately involved in the training and

validation of the OMLT/ POMLT led me to share some of my personal experience from the execution of the IC, which I consider one of the most important aspects of my mission in Afghanistan.

The IC is conducted in Afghanistan over a period of 5 days. The course usually begins within 2-3 days after arrival to Afghanistan. The first day is mainly focused on lectures covering the following topics: mentoring practices, operational situation, intelligence, cultural awareness, Regional Commands specific ROEs, PRE MED and MEDEVAC procedures, and Lessons Learned (LL). Content of the lectures is based on the most current information and LL available from the field. Since all the teams undergo a highly intensive national training and a large number of them also NATO centralized training, organized jointly by the JFTC and JMRC Hohenfels, providing the teams with the most recent information about the situation is highly valued by the trainees.

The second and third day of training is focused on C-IED training carried out by instructors from the C-IED Academy in Kabul (the instructors are either civilian or military subject matter experts) normally operating in two-person teams so called "In-Place COIN Team". The time allotted for the C-IED training is split roughly in half between the theoretical and technical training and practical training. Each training day lasts approximately 10 hours.

The theoretical and technical training contains the latest types of IEDs as well as the methods of employment and new tactics applied by the insurgents. During the practical training the trainees are split into several teams, practise drills and search methods either on vehicles or foot patrols. Instructors from the C-IED Academy constantly evaluate the progress and adjust the training until the teams become fully proficient. The aim of the training is to ensure that all the members of OMLT/ POMLT in Afghanistan fully understand the methodology of C-IED training. Many times it appeared that not all of them were proficient in English.

Days four and five are dedicated to COIN training. The aim is to obtain the ability to implement COIN procedures inside a hostile environment to get the local population to support them. COIN training is conducted under the supervision of instructors from the Military Academy in Kabul. First part of the COIN training focuses on explanation of all aspects of COIN, familiarization with applicable directives and orders and regulations issued by COM ISAF. In the second part, the trainees are again divided into several teams, and each is given a different political, military and material situation. The teams operate independently supervised by instructors.

The IC is based on the flexible approach and can be modified according to specific conditions or requirements, however, each OMLT Commander must reckon with the fact that his unit is to be validated by 45-60 after arriving in Afghanistan. The validation process or periodic assessment (every 60 days) is usually conducted by the same OMLT/ POMLT member, who also led the IC course. Good information flow between the OMLT/ POMLT Division and the OMLT Commander is needed. It facilitates mutual communication, but also, enables the OMLT /POMLT Commanders to adjust the training to their specific needs.

Indeed, as a member of the OMLT/ POMLT Division, I often emphasized to my colleagues that I see the IC as one of the most important aspect of the preparation for the OMLT/ POMLT mission. It is because the IC is based on the most current LL from the operations conducted in Afghanistan and the knowledge and situational awareness are the first prerequisites for successful conduct of the OMLT/ POMLT mission.. ■

Afghanistan Military Education System as a Factor for Rebuilding Governance of the Country

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There is a number of asymmetric threats and risks to the security in many regions worldwide. One of the main threats comes from the so called failed states. We call them states but it is very difficult to determine their system of relations within the community and interaction with international players. That is why the population and the territory of these "states" remain covered for the international community and international organizations and institutions responsible for security. Lack of or limited control over the whole territory makes them shelters for criminals, illegal groups and organizations. As a rule these countries are destitute. They are favourable to individuals seeking opportunities to gain illicit profit based on misery of the local population.

Failed states are actually pseudo states in which personal or group interests prevail over national ones. This makes unequal economic development of different social groups possible. In addition, territories of failed states are full of conflicts between external elements seeking ways to realize their ambitions and gain initiative and bigger international influence. Such external pressure makes the environment within the country uncertain and insecure. What grows as a result is corruption and revanchism which finally leads to criminalization of the state. Such conditions lead to decline of human rights significance and are favorable for ideas of fundamentalism and extremism and could be used by different terrorist organizations.

A typical feature of weak governance is lack of or limited control over certain technologies, materials, know-how etc. And the same weak governance gives unfriendly and hostile people access to such technologies, materials and know-how and allows them to conduct terrorist acts.

This in general terms is the logic of the threats, which the weak state poses. If we add demographic pressure, refugees and IDP's, growing illiteracy, worsening of public services, we are getting closer to the situation in Afghanistan.

Some people say that we should not speak about Afghanistan as about the state, but as about a territory. The population is inhomogeneous, several languages are spoken, and there are several ethnic groups with autonomy of their culture and traditions. Some of these groups are spread throughout the region and are used as an instrument of external influence.

There are a number of surveys about ethnic composition of Afghan society. Among the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) 44% of personnel are Pashtun, 25% - Tajiks, 10% - Hazaras, 8% - Uzbeks and 13% consisting of 12 different ethnic groups like Aimak, Turkmens, Balochs, Arabs etc.

Our conclusions are based on ANA data, because armed forces are foundation for the governance from the remote past until nowadays. This is also how NATO perceives pillars of the state and that is why the NATO goal to resolve the crisis situation concerning Afghanistan is closely related to reforms of security institutions and ANA in particular.

Years of warfare in Afghanistan have created a particular perception of war and peace, according to which it hardly presumes help from the outside. Therefore, it is necessary to rebuild Afghanistan Army in order to ease the aggressive attitude of the local population to the surrounding world. Lack of confidence in relations has led to disunion of the community, isolation of the country and destruction and degradation all over the country.

Based on the circumstances in the country and analyses of numerous experts, NATO started a special program for cooperation in 2006. The idea was to unite the nation through creating united Afghan National Army. The ANA would then support reforms of security institutions and finally would create conditions for strengthening governance.

Although the idea on which the program for cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan is based is apparently good, because the results are visible, the rebuilding of the ANA and the security institution as a whole is ineffective. This conclusion is based on high expenditures of allied forces and absence of plan, which would guide implementation of different activities and measure achievements toward defined goals. It was assessed that in many aspects of governance NATO initiative was too ambitious and hasty. The Afghan government was not given the necessary time to accept the idea

as its own and to assume responsibility for the rule which it exercises. The commitment of NATO to build and train ANA has put many Afghan officers in passive positions. For many of them the most important thing has been to guarantee their posts and salaries instead of contributing to establishment of an effective army.

It is clear that Afghanistan does not have the ability to sustain the required army on its own. Then several questions appear:

- To what extent the good idea could be implemented?
- What are the risks if external financing stops and Afghanistan has to finance a rela tively big army on its own?
- Under the conditions of economic crisis how long will NATO nations continue to provide recourses?

Now, Afghan GDP exceeds 11 billion USD but these resources are extremely insufficient to provide normal existence for about 27 million people and sustainment of a big army. In 2010 ANA numbered about 130 000 and was expected to exceed 170 000 in two years' time. It is far beyond capabilities of Afghan people to sustain such an army without external support. That means that in the future ANA should be reduced but nobody takes into account the price the society will have to pay for such a reduction of the army.

Assessment of the current situation in the armed forces brings out some critical questions. One of the main issues is the fact that many differences exist among the positions of the leadership at the highest level. There is for example intention to create a centre for tank specialists but there is no agreement where it should be created. There is no common position about the necessity of such a centre either. This is just an example that shows lack of expertise concerning reforming of the armed forces and this is actually the real problem. The number of troops and weapon systems are not the only requirements for an army to be effective, there are requirements for well prepared personnel at all levels of leadership and command and control from political-military through strategic and operational to tactical level.

Another problem is nonexistence of a common model for armed forces personnel development and for officers in particular. For example, there are no common criteria for selection of officers that will be sent for education abroad or in the country. Determination of criteria and decision who will be sent for education is responsibility of the corps commanders and often these criteria are based on tribal or family relationship. If we take into account the level of literacy in the country we can conclude that it is possible that illiterate personnel will be selected. Afterwards, the same personnel are assigned to military training centres and that makes training and education system do not work as they should.

Next, it is worth mentioning lack of coordination between NATO advisors at different levels. A lot of projects are executed at the lowest tactical levels without any supervision from higher levels. At the same time, different nations are responsible for training of different audiences. For example the USA run soldier training primarily, the UK train non-commissioned officers, and France assumed responsibility for officers' training. Thus different audiences are subject to different influence which questions effective collective training of the armed forces as a whole.

All the above shows that reconstruction of military education system should be one of the main parts of a military cooperation program between NATO and Afghanistan. This would allow educating well trained leaders at all levels, able to assume responsibility for rebuilding defense and security institutions and execute effective leadership of these institutions afterwards. Thus, creation of a professional military education system appears to be the key task for NATO in Afghanistan.

Additionally, analysis of the real situation in the country and the requirements for effectively working defense and security institutions able to face current risks shows this is necessary to have an effective military education system. Considering the real situation in Afghanistan and the requirements for well prepared leaders, capable of handling the governance of the country, controlling armed forces and dealing with security risks we can conclude that it is necessary to build the defense institutions on a scientific base. NATO help in this respect could support creation of a core of Afghan experts or a centre for creation and development of educational policy of the Ministry of Defense. This policy would then be applied for building of a system or a model for career development of armed forces personnel, to support permanent strong relations between MoD and the Armed Forces and finally to contribute to development of required military elite ready to make nationally responsible decisions in the field of security.

For the future existence of the Afghan army, clear understanding based on widely known NATO approach to defense capabilities review is required. Such an approach would support development of vision for the new Armed Forces. It would clarify the structure of the Armed Forces, their equipment, sustainment expenditures, required modernization and last but not least their future commitments.

Enlargement of the Armed Forces is related to their goals, structure and capabilities for training, which actually provides professional basis for their existence. If nowadays these issues are managed mainly by sponsoring countries, then in the future there will be requirements for operational doctrines. Without such doctrines it will be hard to find arguments for independent handling of these issues by Afghan leadership. All the efforts for the development of the Afghan Armed Forces will fail if it is not clear "what the Armed Forces will be used for" and "how to organize and conduct the training of the Armed Forces".

In conclusion we can underline that the development of defense institutions of Afghanistan will help create conditions for future economic development and prosperity but it is not an easy task. The development of the Armed Forces will affect regional and international security environment as well. This should be considered by NATO as well as by political leadership of member nations while making decision what help should be provided to Afghanistan and how to support the defense institutions development. This requirement is posed by the fact that as a current priority for the international community Afghanistan is a focal point because of a vast amount of resources and if these resources are not managed adequately this could lead to undesired effects. Nowadays Afghanistan has bigger needs of knowledge and qualification in support of the governance and control of defense institution than the material dimension of the supplied support. ■

Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

Note:
At the moment of writing this article the Bi-SC C-IED Campaign Plan is not official yet. It is in process to be signed.

MAJ Francois De Jonge,
Staff Officer in the JFTC Exercise Centre Branch

From 15 to 17 May the JFTC hosted the NATO Allied Command Transformation Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Conference. The JFTC hosted the conference for the second time.

The subject of the conference was the following: "**A Comprehensive Approach to Countering Threat Networks and IEDs**".

The conference participants came from NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP), Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) and organizations involved in the C-IED comprehensive approach.

Besides the mentioned subject there were six other topics discussed during the conference:

1. The Future of C-IED in NATO.
2. A Comprehensive Approach to C-IED.
3. Technical Exploitation.
4. Network Analysis and Targeting.
5. Institutionalizing C-IED.
6. Counter-IED beyond 2014.

Both the subject and the main topics became the major discussion points during the NATO C-IED Campaign Plan sessions. The JFTC was a part of those discussions too being particularly interested and actively involved in the training parts. Before I elaborate on the conference and the campaign plan I would like to give a short background summary over why and how this campaign plan review started.

At the end of 2011, the senior NATO leadership, countries and partners were given a brief by the Joint Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). A group of intelligence specialist from the Counter-Improvised Explosives Devices Operations Integration Centre (COIC) which is a part of JIEDDO compiled the brief about Improvised Explosive Device (IED) use outside Afghanistan and Iraq.

In some countries there was an understanding that IEDs were only a problem in Afghanistan and Iraq but the provided brief showed 16000 IED attacks throughout the world which made thousands of casualties. SACT ordered the C-IED IPT and the C-IED capability monitor to review the campaign plan as soon as possible to get C-IED institutionalized.

The Bi-SC C-IED Campaign plan

As said before, JFTC took part in the campaign planning sessions. They were held at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at the C-IED Centre of Excellence (COE) in Madrid. The objectives for the campaign plan were the following:

a. Reduce the strategic impact of IEDs in current and future operations through the Comprehensive Approach to Countering Threat Networks

b. Institutionalize Countering Threat Networks (CTN)
c. Institutionalize Defeat the Device (DtD)
d. Institutionalize Prepare the Force (PtF)

NATOs CIED Campaign Plan is conducted along three Lines of Effort (LOE); CTN, PtF and DtD. Decisive tasks are identi-

fied within the three LOEs with appropriate linkage to other decisive tasks in the Campaign Plan.

The main effort for NATO will be the CTN LOE which will have an impact on the future exercise scenarios and will be a part of training that the JFTC will provide in the future. Prepare the Force was a supporting effort in the Campaign Plan but is the main effort for ACT and also for the JFTC.

So what are the CTN and the PtF? And what is their impact on the JFTC?

As mentioned above, the CTN Line of Effort is NATO's main effort and was also the focus of the Bi-SC C-IED Campaign plan. Countering Threat Networks is the strategic approach to Attacking the Network (AtN) through the employment of the Comprehensive Approach. This can be achieved through:

a. Interdicting/ Neutralizing/ Isolating and exploiting threat networks

b. Supporting/ Reinforcing friendly networks

c. Influencing neutral networks

The CTN LOE is an Intelligence led operation focused not only on IEDs. For example smuggling, piracy, trafficking, drugs etc. How to implement this is training will be a challenge not only for the JFTC but for all the training entities within NATO.

The supporting effort to the Campaign Plan is to Prepare the Force LOE. This is the main effort for ACT and also the JFTC. Prepare the Force describes all the supporting measures and activities necessary to prepare forces or staff for operations in the area where IED threat is possible.

NATO C-IED Conference, 15 – 17 May 2012

For the second year in a row Bydgoszcz was chosen as the venue to hold the annual C-IED conference. This was the seventh C-IED conference in NATO history and approximately 30 countries were represented. They were not only NATO but also Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue partners. This shows the importance of this conference but also willingness of the participants to act against IEDs.

As mentioned before the main topics were:

1. The Future of C-IED in NATO
2. Comprehensive Approach to C-IED
3. Technical Exploitation
4. Network Analysis and Targeting
5. Institutionalizing C-IED
6. Counter-IED beyond 2014

I would like to highlight Technical Exploitation and the Comprehensive Approach to C-IED since they have some common points and they are essential during the ongoing and future operations.

During the NATO summit in Chicago the Minister of Defence of the Netherlands officially announced being in the 'lead' of the new Biometrics policy within NATO. The

Netherlands is supported by the USA and Denmark in this effort.

The lessons learned of our current operations showed that there are 'Biometrics gaps'. We as NATO can be more successful in prosecuting possible insurgents who are responsible for emplacing IEDs. Every IED has a 'signature'. It can usually be found in the elements used to build the device (e.g. fingerprints). With common policy regarding sharing information, how to collect evidence and how to lead Evidence Based Operations we will be more successful in future operations.

We need to be more comprehensive as sharing biometrics within NATO is not sufficient to be successful. The United Kingdom is ahead of NATO and it was presented in the UK Comprehensive Approach lecture. We should learn from them.

All in all it was a successful conference and there was plenty of room for discussions. There is still a lot to be done but we have definitely chosen the right path. ■

Kandak Military Advisor Team NATO Training

LTC Jose Munaiz and SGM Arthur Fontani,
the JFTC Mission Training Branch

General Aspects

The development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), primarily composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), is critical for transition of responsibility for security to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). In the same way, the provision of advisory capability (formerly known as Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT)) and Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLT) is one of the most significant contributions nations can make to support ANSF development within the framework of the announced Transition Process (Inteqal). This concept takes into account the need to develop the ANSF's ability to conduct autonomous operations in the context of Inteqal, and reduction of ISAF troop levels through 2014.

One Military Advisor Team (MAT) is a capability consisting of leadership and subject matter experts, collocated with or in close proximity to an ANSF unit at any level of effectiveness. A MAT can also provide direct access to coalition capabilities such as joint fires, intelligence, and medical evacuation.

The mission of the MAT is to teach, coach and advise ANSF units, provide the conduit of liaison and command and control and when required, support the operational planning and employment of the ANSF unit to which they are aligned in order to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent and professional ANSF capable of autonomous operations.

Minimum requirements for each unit of assignment and the final composition of the Team will be based on the need of the ANSF unit assigned, TCN capabilities, and the assessed threat in the area of operations. Nations have a flexibility to provide more robust forces to include additional enablers and force protection commensurate with the threat.

Training of the Military Advisor Teams (MATs)

MAT training is conducted in three phases and is designed to establish a common standard across all teams. The three phases of training are: individual training by contributing nations, **centralized NATO sponsored Training**, and in-theatre training.

Even though MAT´s preparation and training is a national responsibility, the support to the training from NATO and ISAF to the training is essential for standardized development when an ANA unit conducts operations with ISAF and other ANSF forces.

Nations can choose to execute phase II at their own expense or utilize NATO offers of common funded Phase II training. The NATO phase II training ensures standardization and offers training opportunities which most of the Nations cannot establish by national means.

NATO phase II training events have been organized since 2006 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Centre (JMRC) in Hohenfels-Germany, on behalf of NATO and till now, 275 teams have been trained.
This training is exclusively dedicated to the Kandak level (Infantry, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support)

During phase II, Battalion level MAT personnel attend a 15-day training program conducted in two phases, an academic phase and a field training phase. Constantly updated and in line with COMISAF priorities, it is based on disseminating one-source knowledge of ANA doctrine/TTPs, training principles providing standard instructions in accordance with ANA TTPs and current Standard Operations Procedures (SOPs), while enhancing force protection capabilities through COIN and C-IED training. Finally it ensures the ability to coordinate ANSF

and ISAF operations and ISAF MAT procedures. It is short in duration but dense in its execution. It is based on the provision of an as realistic as possible training environment that most of the Nations cannot provide, of which an updated curriculum, instructors, real ANSF and/ or replicators. During the training, the MATs advise theirs ANA-ANP/ Replicator counterparts at the equivalent level. The training focus is based on a "Train the Trainer" methodology.

In the field part of the training, different Situational Training Exercises lanes are used. Advising techniques, Restraint/ Escalation of Force, C-IED, COIN Fundamentals, Tactical Movement, Integrating Enablers are commonly applied topics for all the exercises. Finally, the training is completed by a culmination exercise, during which a Kandak level Cordon and Search mission is conducted involving all the teams and their counterparts.

Besides that, it must be taken into consideration that the MAT training at the JMRC is combined with the training of the District Level Police Advisor Teams (PAT). This offers both PATs and MATs an opportunity to be trained in a more complex and realistic exercises.

JFTC role in Kandak MAT training

The JFTC has specific responsibilities during every Kandak Training Event (4 training events per year).

Once the JFCBS has sent the Invitation Letter for the training, the JFTC starts tracking participation. All the request are received directly from the nations and the JFTC establishes priorities coordinating with the training Centre (JMRC). The JFTC sends the MAT/ PAT combined training Confirmation Letter in coordination with the JFCBS and JMRC includes the invitation for the Final Coordination Conference.

The JFTC provides the Command and Control Element to coordinate the reception, staging, movement and training of the teams at JMRC. Consequently, the JFTC serves as the "point of entry" for nations to the training. It organizes and conducts the in/ out processing, coordinate the real life support issues between the training audience and the JMRC. During the training it coordinates Subject Matter Experts' (SME) activities and conducts SME meetings. To accomplish all these tasks, before every training event, the JFTC has to deploy the NATO C2 Element, consisting of 6 personnel, to Hohenfels.
After the training, the JFTC provides an After Action Review Report contributing to the AAR/ LL process with the organizations involved.

The last Combined Kandak MAT/ PAT Training Event 12-02 has recently finished successfully with the participation of 15 teams and a Training Audience of 386 personnel from 6 nations (Croatia, Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the United States). 429 soldiers from Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic and Ukraine served as ANSF replicators. ■

"There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don't know."

Donald Rumsfeld (February 12, 2002)

Architecture: Why and How

Dr. Dirk Coppieters,
Principal Scientist working for NC3A in the Hague
Aad Hendriks,
Senior Scientist working for NC3A in the Hague

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to provide a description of the baseline architecture that has been developed to describe the computer assisted exercise (CAX) processes, applications and infrastructure as they are used today by the JFTC to support the execution of ISAF RC exercises. We will describe what the architecture consists of and how it can be developed and presented. Most importantly we will present how an organisation can benefit from having an explicitly described architecture, provided the necessary organisational constructs are put in place.

Architecture, what is it?

A formal definition taken from IEEE describes architecture as: *The fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components, their relationships to each other, and to the environment, and the principles guiding its design and evolution.*[2] A less formal approach to architecture is given to us by Dilbert who characterizes architecture as a bunch of shapes connected by lines with some impressive words added to it.[3]



Architecture originated in the building construction world and is now commonly used in describing business processes, information systems, software applications, hardware platform systems and computer networks. It has been adopted by businesses in many sectors worldwide e.g. defence, public, finance

In the context of the work that was conducted for the JFTC, we have defined a set of terms to capture an architecture that is compliant with the overall guidance on architectural descriptions as defined in the NATO Architectural Framework (NAF[4]). These terms assist us in describing what an organisation needs to do, how it plans to do it, how its various parts interact and how they are actually implemented. This results in an architecture that consists of a description of a set of processes and activities, a set of actors and systems, a set of interfaces and communication items and infrastructure.

Since we have described the existing situation at the JFTC, the architecture is referred to as a baseline.[5]

The JFTC CAX Baseline Architecture

The JFTC CAX Baseline Architecture task has been conducted by NC3A under the supervision of LTC Georgios Kyriakidis, the JFTC CAX Branch Head. NC3A was tasked to deliver the JFTC CAX Baseline Architecture description as part of its general support project for JFTC. The architectural description has been delivered together with the latest NATO CAX applications in May 2012 at the JFTC to provide the most current

A CAX is a sub-type of Command Post eXercise/SYNthetic EXercise where computers simulate the operational environment.

In the case of NATO CAX exercises, the exercise is driven by one or more simulations. A simulation is a system that reflects real world processes and behaviours inside a computer system. Depending on the type of simulation, logistic processes, ground operations, air operations, naval operations, etc. can be represented. In order to respond to decisions that are made by the training audience, interactive simulations are employed in CAXes. Based on the instructions entered in the simulation, an updated state of the synthetic world is calculated. In many cases, the output information from the simulation can be used as an input for Functional Area Systems (FAS) that are used inside the command post.

As NATO employs mainly nationally-developed simulations, custom tools are required to assist exercise control teams to manage what is happening inside the simulation(s), to enter instructions and to extract relevant information. This aspect is addressed through specific NATO CAX applications. They add functions that are not covered by the simulation but are important for the execution of the exercise. Some of these applications focus on the interface between the simulation and the FAS systems. Others enhance or ease the interaction with the simulation.[1]

and up-to-date view of processes and applications.

Focus: CAX for RC-North

This baseline architecture delivers an overview of the processes and activities that are executed during RC North exercises together with the applications that support them and the information that they exchange. Hence the baseline architecture may be used for education and consultation purposes and it can serve as a starting point for analyses to improve the support to RC-North exercises and to JFTC exercises in general.

The JFTC CAX baseline architecture is a refinement of the baseline architecture that has been developed to describe the CAX-related processes and applications delivered to the JFTC and to the JWC through capability package CP 9B0401. It is focussed on the execution phase of the exercise between STARTEX and ENDEX of the mission rehearsal exercise and therefore currently does not include a description of the planning, preparation and after action review phases. The rationale for this reduction in scope is that 90% of the CAX applications are designed to be used during the execution phase and that the emphasis of this task is on describing the relationships of the current toolset with the processes and activities they are used in.

A View on the Architecture Views

The baseline architecture consists of three main areas containing a number of views each highlighting different aspects of the area. The process and activity area shows the activities executed by the EXCON organisation during the execution of the exercise. The application area provides information on the usage of the applications during the execution. The infrastructure area provides information on the software that is installed on the exercise hardware. In addition two views provide insight into the linkage between processes and applications and between applications and the supporting infrastructure. This makes it possible to traverse the architecture information from left to right and from top (Process and activities) to bottom (Infrastructure) and vice versa.

In order to develop a formal architectural description that can be stored and queried in an automated manner, these views have been expressed in concepts that are compliant with the NATO Architectural Framework and stored in a supporting architecture development environment. These enabling views also known as meta-models allow the reader to understand the architecture in an unambiguous manner.

ARIS 7.1 was chosen as the architecture development environment because it is the predominant architecture environment within NC3A. All architectures that are developed to describe command and control capabilities that are currently being developed and implemented in NATO are stored in ARIS. By employing this formal approach to architecture, the description becomes more than a bunch of shapes and complicated words that Dilbert mentions in the cartoon. It becomes a tool used to perform meaningful analysis.



All the views together including the architecture meta-model information are stored in the ARIS repository. An HTML snapshot from the architecture has been generated from the repository and it has been delivered to the JFTC as the main JFTC CAX

architecture baseline product. In addition, a number of Excel spreadsheets have been generated to manipulate tabular data easily. The HTML snapshot and the spreadsheets allow the use of the architecture outside the ARIS development environment.

Building the Architecture

The first step in developing the JFTC CAX baseline architecture for the exercise execution phase was to agree with the JFTC that the architecture had to be NAF-compliant in the sense that it follows the guidelines regarding architecture views and entities including their relations mentioned in the NAF. Subsequently we decided together with the project sponsor which NAF views the architecture should contain. With that information we were able to define a so-called meta-model that able to express the agreed views, be NAF compliant and could be stored in ARIS.



In order to gather the content of the baseline architecture a bottom-up process was adopted. We started by collecting the necessary data for the infrastructure views working our way up to the application views and finishing with the process views. Subject Matter Experts from NC3A and the JFTC CAX Branch provided the raw information about servers, software, applications and processes. This information was captured in Excel spreadsheets that were structured according to the meta-model. Excel was chosen because it provides a lot of built-in features (macros, functions) that are very useful for structuring, enriching and analysing large information sets. However, for the process and activities views, a graphical representation in the Visio drawing tool was used to capture the relevant data before exporting them to Excel. Indeed the sequence and flow of processes and activities and their associated information exchange is easier to comprehend in a graphical form than in a tabular presentation.

After all the information was collected, it was imported into the ARIS environment. The agreed views were subsequently constructed in ARIS. In contrast with the data import function which is an automated action in ARIS, the views had to be crafted manually since no automated function exists to create these complex views. When all the views were completed, the HTML snapshot was generated. In order to provide additional analytical support, Excel spreadsheets were generated and included in the product.

Achieving benefits

The quote from Donald Rumsfeld at the beginning of this article is very much applicable to architecture in general and to this architecture in particular. Indeed the architecture products will clearly indicate what we know and also what is still missing (we don't know, because it has been deliberately scoped out). The interesting part from the quote is the unknown unknowns or the things we haven't got a clue about because we never thought of them. The architecture description and particularly the linkage between the process, activities and applications can assist in the analysis of blank spots i.e. activities that are not supported by any application or the identification of areas that overlap i.e. activities that are supported by multiple applications. The architectural description can assist in making unknown unknowns become known unknowns i.e. areas that should be investigated.



Communicate

This baseline architecture description is an excellent product for education of people who want or need to know what is happening during the execution of RC-North or similar exercises. It shows what activities are expected to be performed by exercise control personnel involved in CAX-related



matters and what functionality of the CAX application toolset and FAS systems can be used to support the activity. This information is particularly suited to educate augmentees or other newcomers to the exercise. On the infrastructure and application side, it provides insight into functionality that is offered by applications and which of the applications depend on each other because they exchange information. Such understanding is particularly valuable for the setup before an exercise and serves as support during the exercise.

Transform

Transformation is perhaps a big word to use but all planned changes regardless how big or small they are, can be considered as some sort of transformation from a current state to a desired state. As discussed above, the baseline architecture can assist in identifying areas where change might be desirable e.g. to provide application support for a particular process, combine functionality of applications into a single application or modify the infrastructure by reducing dependencies. Once a desired state has been defined, the baseline architecture is critical in estimating the efforts required for the transformation.

Implement

As the baseline architecture describes what is currently implemented at the JFTC, no implementation changes will follow directly from the baseline architecture. However, it contains very relevant information that can contribute to other processes such as:

- Establishment of CAX-related SOPs
- Implementation of Configuration Management of the CAX environment

Enabling success

In order to benefit from the description of the current baseline in a structured and exploitable manner, the baseline architecture description should become an integral part of the change management process. The architecture needs to be seen as a means to an end and not as an end in itself. It is a tool and like any tool, it needs practice and maintenance. The following three specific areas need to be addressed to exploit the existing data effectively.

Validate

Before the architecture can be validated, the JFTC personnel will need to become familiar with the concepts and with the structure of the architecture. Once understood, the architecture can be checked for accurate content and omissions and amendments can be scheduled to be incorporated in next versions of the architecture.

Adopt

The architecture needs to be recognized as a valuable tool. Therefore it is suggested to present the architectural description internally to increase understanding of the activities and tools that are necessary to make effective use of simulation during exercises. Feedback should be sought about the insight that is achieved by making the data available.

Sustain

The architectural description itself should become a part of the configuration controlled items that are managed by the JFTC. An approach for its maintenance should be defined and implemented. Potentially architectural baseline updates should be explicitly linked to the updates of CAX baseline configurations. ■

Acronyms and abbreviations

ARIS - Architecture of Integrated Information Systems
CAX - Computer Assisted Exercise
CP - Capability Package
ENDEX - End of Exercise
FAS - Functional Area Systems
HTML - Hyper Text Markup Language
NAF - NATO Architecture Framework
SOPs - Standing Operating Procedures
STARTEX - Start of Exercise

[1] Definition of CAX according to the The Bi-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 75-3, dated 28 Oct 2010

[2] Definition taken from IEEE Std 1471-2000: IEEE Recommended Practice for Architectural Description of Software-Intensive Systems

[3] http://dilbert.com/strips/comic/2000-02-27/

[4] Version 3 of the NAF can be accessed via http://www.nhqc3s.nato.int/ARCHITECTURE/_docs/NAF_v3/ANNEX1.pdf

[5] Other NATO architectures include: the ISAF baseline architecture, the overarching architecture. A good source for architecture material within NATO is located at: http://tide.act.nato.int. Note that a login may be required

Training Objectives – Keeping the Alliance Fit

LTC Jakob Fahrendorff,,
Senior Officer in the Exercises & Training Branch (Capability Area Team 3) at NC3A

"In Chicago, we will adopt a series of measures in the fields of education and training, exercises and technology, to make sure that our forces maintain the strong connections they have developed during our operations. We call it the Connected Forces Initiative - It's about keeping our Alliance fit for the long term – for 2020 and beyond."

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (April 18, 2012)

The Connected Forces Initiative

At the Munich Security Conference in February 2012, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen first introduced the concept of "Connected Forces Initiative" as a complementary initiative and a stepping stone for NATO towards the long-term strategy goal of "Smart Defence".

He emphasised that "Smart Defence" capabilities alone will not suffice for the Alliance, but rather the ability to connect all NATO forces through common understanding, language, standards, doctrine, procedures and command and control arrangements will be the key to NATO's success.

The Secretary General relied on the three areas of the Connected Forces Initiative, education, training and exercises and better use of technology to contribute to NATO forces maintaining the connections they have developed during operations. He foresaw, as NATO draws down from operations in Afghanistan the exercise programme will build up and the NATO training centres, the JWC and the JFTC are expected to play a key role in this[1].

The "Connected Forces Initiative" was adopted by the nations at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012 and for the JFTC the initiative seems to imply that as ISAF related training decreases, the NATO exercise programme and NRF related exercises will increase. However, the rationale behind the Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative is "Doing more with less" which translated to training and exercise probably means "Getting more for less". As budgets are cut and prioritizations made in national defence forces, also the JFTC is therefore likely to face an increased demand for both effectiveness and efficiency. The purpose of this article is to discuss an area where effectiveness indeed can be enhanced with only a small effort.

NATO Training and Exercises

One aim of the Connected Forces Initiative is to have more effective training to meet better defined objectives, conducted in a more efficient manner. It requires training methods, materials, technology and resource expenditure all to be optimized, but conceptually NATO is well poised for this.

The corner stone in the NATO Collective Training and Exercise construct is the Systems Approach to Training[2] which ensures that training and exercise activities are based on analysis of NATO missions; that exercise design, development and conduct is focused on specific training objectives; that we evaluate whether the training has achieved the objectives in an effective and efficient way and we validate whether the training meets the operational requirements.

The NATO Exercise Training Model[3] constitutes a robust framework for the actual exercise conduct and includes four phases of tailored training. Individual functional training and collective cross functional training followed by Crisis Response Planning set the foundation and prepares the training audience for the actual exercise execution. The exercise execution is focused on achieving the specific training objectives and enables the HQ to practice its critical missions and tasks. An assessment phase finally captures lessons identified and requirements for improvements in HQs organisation, processes, procedures and training.

The toolset supporting NATO training and exercises, not only the Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM) is directly tailored to and focused on the effective conduct of the exercise process.

Acronyms and abbreviations

AAR – After Action Review
ACO – Allied Command for Operations
AJP – Allied Joint Paper
ATP – Allied Tactical Paper
C2 – Command and Control
CJOC – Combined Joint Operation Centre
EXCEN – Exercise Centre
EXCON – Exercise Control
HICON – Higher Control
HQ – Headquarters
LOCON – Lower Control
MEDEVAC – Medical Evacuation
MEL/MIL – Main Events List/Main Incidents List
NRF – NATO Response Force
OCE – Officer Conducting the Exercise
ODE – Officer Directing the Exercise
OSE – Officer Scheduling the Exercise
SME – Subject Matter Expert
SOP – Standard Operating Procedures
TIC – Troops in Contact

Training Objectives

Practical implementation of the Connected Forces Initiative, however, may be a challenge. Training and exercises in NATO are already well planned and executed and with our two NATO training centres we have, despite budget restrictions, witnessed a steady improvement of NATO training over the last 6-8 years. So, faced with a demand to enhance effectiveness to "Provide more for less", we must identify areas where an additional effort could improve the quality of our training without also incurring additional costs. One such area is our training objectives. Better quality of our training objectives will provide a better focus for planning, execution and assessment of our training and exercises, thus improving both effectiveness and efficiency.

In a NATO context a training objective is defined as a desired goal expressed in terms of performance under the set conditions related to a defined standard. For a defined training audience, it describes the knowledge, skills or attitudes to be achieved during the training, the desired outcome of the training and the measures for assessing the performance. This means that a NATO training objective consists of a specific performance requirement – the tasks; the training situation – the conditions; and the level of performance – the standard[4] and it should define the primary, supporting and enabling HQ tasks to be trained[5]. Training objectives form the basis for the NATO exercise process and are exploited throughout the entire life cycle of an exercise.

However, for several reasons developing exploitable training objectives is a challenge. Very often training objectives are selected directly from the Mission Essential Tasks of the training audience HQ or from the NATO Tasks List[6], which in both cases lead to almost generic training objectives like "Exercise Tactical Command & Control"; "Develop & Issue Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)" and "Prepare Plans or Orders"[7] etc. These are very broadly formulated, not broken down into primary, supporting and enabling HQ tasks and not linked to functional or cross functional training audiences. There are no descriptions of the conditions under which tasks should be accomplished or of the standards for performance. These "training objectives" cannot be adequately exploited through different stages of the exercise process.

For a defined training audience, a Training Objective consists of the HQ training tasks, the training situation – the conditions; and the level of performance – the standards.

The responsibility for the training objectives is split. The commander of the training audience is responsible for the development; training objectives are approved by the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) and promulgated in the Exercise Planning Guidance by the Office Conducting the Exercise (OCE). The role of the Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE) is to provide advice[8] and despite having the responsibility for key stages of the exercise process, ODE involvement in the actual development of the training objectives is limited.

Contrary to the exercise planning and scenario and MEL/MIL development there is no documented NATO process or agreed best practice for training objective development and only limited exercise support tools have so far been developed. Consequently, training objectives are developed by each training audience applying their own ad hoc processes.

Tasks, Conditions and Standards

Despite absence of a documented development process, both the elements of training objectives and their linkage to the Mission Essential Tasks are clear. Consequently, deriving a training objective from a Mission Essential Task should provide the exercise planners with answers to the following questions: Who needs to be trained, what are the HQ tasks to be trained, under which conditions should the HQ tasks be performed and what are the standards?

So, to develop a training objective from a Mission Essential Task like *"Exercise Tactical Command & Control"*, we initially should determine the training audience and which HQ tasks should be trained.

Simplifying, it can be argued that *"Exercise Tactical Command & Control"* can include intelligence, operational planning, execution of current operations etc. where different elements of the HQ are responsible to perform functional HQ tasks which all eventually contribute to the *"Exercise Tactical Command & Control"*. This means that one Mission Essential Task leads to training objectives for each of the involved elements of the HQ.

If we then want to train one element, for instance the Combined Joint Operation Centre (CJOC), we will have to provide training related to the primary functional HQ task of the CJOC, which in this case could

be *"Execute Command & Control (C2)"* and we must identify and train all of the related supporting and enabling tasks.



One Mission Essential Task leads to Training Objectives for each of the involved elements of the HQ.

One of the supporting CJOC tasks related to "Execute C2" is "Incident Management", which may require performance of one or more enabling tasks such as "Build and maintain Situational Awareness", "Execute TIC Battle Drill", "Execute IED Battle Drill", "Execute JPR Battle Drill", "Implement ROE", "Facilitate MEDEVAC", "Conduct Daily Reporting" etc., which all can contribute to "Incident Management". Relevant tasks will all be part of the training objective for the CJOC.

Conditions for the accomplishment of Mission Essential Tasks can be derived from the NATO Task List, but for training objectives, conditions generally can be regarded as "variables of the environment", where the variations can relate to "time", "space", "forces" and "information". For the training audience in the CJOC, time pressure, several simultaneous tasks, long deployment distances for various assets, poor roads, lack of critical capabilities and absence of key information etc. are varying conditions and are all factors which will influence their decision making processes. These factors need to be considered, determined and documented during the exercise planning and carefully managed by the EXCON during the exercise execution.

Standards for the performance of the tasks can be regarded as the criteria for successful task accomplishment. The standards are documented in various NATO or national publications and can be found in the ACO Forces Standards, in doctrine publications like the AJPs and ATPs and the STANAGs, but also in directives and SOPs. As examples, the standard for "Operational Planning" in NATO is presently the interim "ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive"[9] whereas specific standards for CJOC battle drills and reporting should be derived from the CJOC SOPs. Standards should be determined for each training objective based on the relevant operational requirements for performance.

In summary, the refined training objective "Exercise Tactical Command & Control" for the CJOC could be described as "Execute C2 focused on the supporting HQ task "Incident Management" and the enabling HQ tasks "Build and Maintain Situational Awareness", "Execute TIC Battle Drill", Facilitate MEDEVAC" and "Conduct Daily Reporting"." Conditions to be set for the training could be described as "high operational tempo in the CJOC, with two simultaneous TICs both requiring MEDEVAC support. Locations of TICs, MEDEVAC distances and available information should allow the CJOC to complete the MEDEVAC cycles within the doctrinal 60 minutes". The standard for the performance in the training audience could be described as "CJOC execution of the TIC battle drill and facilitation of MEDEVAC including the use of CJOC supporting Functional Area Services (FAS), should be in accordance with relevant CJOC SOPs. Reporting should be conducted in accordance with the "Higher HQ Reporting Directive" and relevant national reporting directives."

Training Objective Life Cycle

The importance of well-defined and documented training objectives becomes clear when we look at how every stage of the exercise process depends on the training objectives.

Exercises should be developed based upon operational requirements and with clear training objectives[10]. This is the basis for scenario development and the training objectives are the foundation for the Main Events List/Main Incidents List (MEL/MIL) which drives exercise execution and focuses on the training opportunities provided to the training audience.

Training Objectives are exploited thro
They focus exercise planning and execution and are

Planning and developing an effective MEL/MIL requires a clear definition of the training audience, in this case the CJOC and of the relevant HQ training tasks: "Incident Management" including "Build and Maintain Situational Awareness", "Execute TIC Battle Drill", Facilitate MEDEVAC" and "Conduct Daily Reporting". These doctrinal HQ tasks and related functional processes can only be deliberately and precisely triggered, if the MEL/MIL storyline is developed with focus on achieving exactly this. A training objective without a defined training audience and defined HQ training tasks does not constitute a basis for effective training.

During exercise execution the EXCON is responsible for setting the conditions for the training[11]. In practice this is done by the Exercise Centre (EXCEN), where the HICON and LOCON response cells interact with the training audience and provide the information which eventually set the conditions for the training audience. Needless to say, that without the desired conditions determined, documented and communicated to the response cells, there is no guarantee that LOCON will generate "a high operational tempo in the CJOC, with two simultaneous

TICs both requiring MEDEVAC support"; and LOCON will not necessarily "locate the TICs and provide information which will allow the CJOC to complete the MEDEVAC cycles within the doctrinal 60 minutes". Only where conditions have been defined in the planning phase will they be set correctly dur-



ughout the life cycle of an exercise.
essential for exercise observation and assessment.

ing execution.

Collection of daily training observations and conduct of daily assessments of the training is essential for the Exercise Director (EXDIR) to provide periodic feedback to the training audience on their progress towards achieving training objectives[12]. The observer/trainers report observations of the processes in training audience, but effective observation can only be planned and conducted if the HQ training tasks are well-defined. The HQ task "Execute TIC Battle Drill" can be triggered at a predetermined time; it is doctrinally defined and the related processes can be precisely observed. A valid assessment of the training progress can be made if the observations of the "TIC Battle Drill" are measured against the defined performance criteria, in this case the CJOC SOP. During the exercise execution the EXCEN requires regular feedback from the observer/trainers on exercise delivery and provision of training opportunities in order to control the exercise and set conditions effectively. With conditions precisely described, it is possible for the observer/trainers and EXCEN to assess if "two simultaneous TICs both requiring MEDEVAC support" generated the desired "high operational tempo in the CJOC" and remedial action can easily be taken in the EXCON if required. Well-defined HQ training tasks, conditions and standards are prerequisites for an effective exercise observation and assessment of training progress and delivery.

The final phase of exercise execution is the After Action Review (AAR), where the training audience commander and key staff are invited to a critical review of their own activities and to assess their own performance in relation to the training objectives[13]. The review is focused on the performance of the HQ training tasks under the given exercise conditions and includes an assessment of own performance against the standards of the training objective. An AAR which includes a CJOC self-assessment of the performance of "Incident Management" in a period with "high operational tempo" against the criteria in the CJOC SOP could capture requirements for improvement in the CJOC organisation, processes, procedures and training[14].

The "Exercise Analysis and Reporting Stage" is mainly focused on conclusions and recommendations related to the achievement of the exercise and training objectives[15]. The Final Exercise Report is built on daily observations and assessments made during the exercise execution and on the outcome of the AAR. Training objectives with defined tasks, conditions and standards is the basis for an exercise report with precise conclusions and actionable recommendations.

Enhancing Effectiveness

Training objectives drive most of the activities in the NATO collective training and exercise process. "A small investment" in this critical element will have a significant effect on the training effectiveness. Scenario and MEL/MIL would more easily be tailored to trigger desired HQ processes and the implementation would require less coordination, be more focussed and maybe even provide a payoff in terms of execution efficiency. Conditions for the training would be set and managed deliberately. Exercise observation would focus on relevant and observable training tasks and assessment of training progress and feedback to the training audience would be based on defined standards for task accomplishment. Conclusions and recommendations in the exercise reports would be precise and actionable.

Considerable resources are committed to exercise planning, production of MEL/MIL and to the actual exercise execution and clear and documented processes exist for each of these steps. However, the foundation for effective training, the training objectives, is often vague, providing opportunity for multiple interpretations and hence, loss of focus. We should regard the development of detailed, specific and complete training objectives as an integral part of the Exercise Concept and Specification Development Stage[16]. Training objectives should be developed in a deliberate manner as a collaborative effort between the training audience and the exercise planners from OCE/ODE. The process should involve both exercise planners and subject matter experts (SMEs) and the training objectives should be documented in an adequate tool which supports later refinement and reuse.

For the JFTC and NC3A the Connected Forces Initiative is an opportunity to further develop expertise and best practices for the NATO exercise process and the suite of tools that supports the process. A deliberate process to develop more "exploitable" training objectives could offer enhanced effectiveness, "provide more for less" and help keep the Alliance fit for the long term. ■

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[1] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_84197.htm
[2] BI-SC Directive 75-2 ETEED p. 2-2
[3] BI-SC Directive 75-2 ETEED p. 4-1
[4] Bi-SC Directive 80-90, NATO Task List, pp. B-1 – B-2
[5] Bi-SC Directive 75-3 CT&ED, p. 17
[6] Bi-SC Directive 80-90, NATO Task List p. B-1
[7] Bi-SC Directive 80-90, NATO Task List pp. A-5-43 – A-5-50
[8] Bi-SC Directive 75-3 CT&ED, p. 17
[9] ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, COPD INTERIM V1.0 dated 17 December 2010.
[10] BI-SC Directive 75-2 ETEED p. 5-1
[11] Bi-SC Directive 75-3 CT&ED, p. 37
[12] Bi-SC Directive 75-3 CT&ED, p. 93
[13] Bi-SC Directive 75-3 CT&ED, p. 93
[14] MC 0458/2 NATO ETEE Policy p. 4-2
[15] Bi-SC Directive 75-3 CT&ED, p. 37
[16] Bi-SC Directive 75-3 CT&ED, p. 33

International Lessons Learned Workshop at the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces

CDR Jarosław Hewelt,
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LTC Andrzej Lis,
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Between 16 and 20 April 2012, Lessons Learned (LL) staff officers of nine NATO nations shared their insights and experience during the second International Lessons Learned Workshop conducted in Bydgoszcz, Poland. The event was organized by the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces (DTC PAF) in cooperation with the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and the US Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

During the first workshop, in 2011, the training audience consisted only of Polish LL officers. This year, the DTC PAF hosted participants from Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and the United States. NATO bodies and international headquarters were represented by the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) and Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE). The LL staff officers of all branches of the Polish Armed Forces participated in this training activity.

The then DTC PAF Director, Brig. Gen. Franciszek Kochanowski in his opening speech highlighted the role of LL staff officers in organizing learning processes. He said: "I am personally convinced that successful lessons learned culture in your organisations can be positively influenced by you, lessons learned staff officers. You, within your organisations, have to lead for the overall output of the lessons learned process. You have to advise commanders. The best way to do it is to ensure that the lessons learned products are of the best quality and they provide added value".

Information and Knowledge Management, Lessons Learned and organizational learning are traditionally associated with large multinational corporations. Nevertheless, in recent years they have become highly recognized in military organizations, too. Due to the nature of the rapidly changing security environment, the ability to identify and implement improvement has quickly become of paramount importance to operational capabilities of the Armed

Forces and the Alliance. Lessons drawn from operations, exercises and activities subject to the procedure of identification, rectification and implementation lead to increased effectiveness, efficiency and best practices, and in consequence strengthen national and Alliance defence capabilities. Therefore, military organisations need effective Lessons Learned systems, the systems which can assist commanders in their efforts to improve capabilities of their subordinate structures in the peacetime, crisis and war.

The main objective of the workshop was to share knowledge and exchange experience on NATO and national Lessons Learned systems and processes. The secondary objective was to create an environment conducive to information sharing and relationship building, while highlighting the benefits of the LL methodologies.

During the five-day workshop, military analysts were exploring the issues of capturing observations, planning and conducting analyses, implementing remedial actions and disseminating Lessons Learned. The workshop included lectures, seminars, discussions and syndicate work. Workshop participants actively contributed to the business and delivered briefings on their national LL capabilities.

Although the workshop program was very intensive, the participants had an opportunity to visit some of the most beautiful sites of Bydgoszcz and Toruń. ■

THE PEOPLE

Assistant Professor Pavel BUČKA

Assistant Professor Pavel Bučka is a Vice-Rector for Education at the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas. After graduating from the Military Technical University in Liptovsky Mikulas in 1982, he started working for the Air Defence of the State as a platoon commander. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and became a company commander. He served as a company commander for two years and then after promotion to the rank of captain, he became a battalion engineer. In 1986 he assumed a position of a battalion chief in Zdejcina, where after one year he became a battalion commander and in his next job he prepared the unit for the use of new air defence equipment in Kacice.

In 1990, the commander of the brigade sent him to the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas to begin postgraduate studies in the field of Air Defence of the State. He completed the studies with a doctorate examination in 1994 and received PhD. The dissertation focused on the co-operation between Rocket Corps and Air Force.

He assumed the position of the Vice-Rector for Education in the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas on 23 September 2008. For more than 5 years he was the Chief of the Air Defence Department at the Academy of the Armed Forces. He has been an Associate Professor in the Management Department at the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas for two years.

Professor Bučka attended a number of courses including "Defence and Society: Principle and Practise" at the Military Academy in Liptovský Mikulaš in 1996 and graduated with distinction. He also attended an English Language Course in Beaconsfield, England, in July 1997, and then, "Advanced Command and Staff Course Number 1" at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in Bracknell, England, from September 1997 to July 1998 and was awarded the qualification of psc(j).

He took part in the "United Step Exercise" at the UK Combat Manoeuvre Simulation Centre in Sennelager in 1999 and 2000 and in 2002 and 2005 organised the "Common Force" international exercises.

Professor Bučka is a graduate of the Executive Program in Advanced Security Studies which he attended from September to December 2006 at the College of International and Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Also in 2006 he completed managerial courses and received ECDL certificate in 2006.

On 16 March 2000 he received the title of the Assistant Professor in the field of National Air Defence and Air Force.

Prof. Bučka speaks Czech, English, Polish and Russian.

He is/ was a board member of:

- the common board for Operational and Combat Use of Air Force and Air Defence Force till 31 December 2010.
- the common board for Operational and Combat use of Ground Forces till 31 December 2010.
- Working group "Future Armed Forces Conception".
- the Science Board of the Air Defence Faculty of Armed Forces Academy 1999-2004.
- the Armed Forces Academy, the Science Board 2004-2007.
- a working group member - RTO MSG-007 Distributed learning and simulation to support the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme.
- a working group member - RTO MSG-003 Modelling and Simulation Technology in Support of Simulation Based Acquisition.
- the chairman of the editorial committee of the "Military Reflection".
- of the editorial committee of the Acta Avionica.
- of the board National and international security PhD study.
- of the science board of Armed Forces Academy.
- of the science board presidency of Armed Forces Academy.

JFTC Maintains the Right Course with Cooperation from the Polish Navy

CDR Jarosław Kutka,
JFTC Analysis and Reporting Section Head

On 12 April 2012 the Commander of the NATO Joint Force Training Centre, Major General Pavel Macko, together with his deputy, Brigadier General Grzegorz Buszka, and the Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Jaromir Zuna, visited a maritime city of Gdynia, the home of the Polish Naval Headquarters, the Naval Academy and the 3rd Flotilla of Ships. That was the first time that the JFTC Command Group had a chance to learn more about Polish Navy. The Commander of the Maritime Operations Centre, Rear Admiral Stanislaw Zarychta, the former JFTC Deputy Commander hosted the visit.

The visit began with a meeting between the Commander of the Joint Force Training Centre, and the Commander of the Polish Maritime Operations Centre. They discussed possibilities of future cooperation and exchanged their respective experiences in training. The meeting was also attended by the Maritime Operations Centre staff, who briefly presented tasks and responsibilities of the Polish Maritime Operations Centre and roles that the Maritime Operations Centre assumes in commanding of the Polish Naval Forces and how the Centre coordinates mis-

sions conducted at sea, in air and on land.

The delegation then visited the harbor of Gdynia, where they were accompanied by the Commander of the Polish 3rd Ships Flotilla, Rear Admiral Jarosław Ziemiański. The 3rd Flotilla group consists of combat ships (missile frigates, fast patrol boats and an anti-submarine ship), submarines and specialized purpose ships, hydrographic vessels and auxiliaries. The JFTC and Polish Navy delegation went onboard the “ORP Gen. K. Pułaski” anti-submarine warfare frigate and the "Orzeł" submarine.

The JFTC Command Group’s visit to Gdynia concluded with a stop at the Polish Naval Academy. The Commandant of the Polish Naval Academy Rear Admiral Czesław Dyrcz welcomed the delegation. Then, the officers from the Academy familiarized the JFTC Command Group with the facilities of their modern training base. During his office call with the JFTC Command Group, Rear Admiral Dyrcz briefed the primary tasks of the Naval Academy and presented the ways in which the students are educated. The JFTC Commander was extremely keen on the Academy’s education capabilities and especially the international cooperation component of training. After the meeting, the delegation had an opportunity to walk around the campus and see the most noteworthy of the naval Academy’s facilities. The route was very diverse and provided an opportunity to see the laboratories, classrooms and simulators. There was also a chance to see the conditions that are set up for the cadets who are currently studying at the Academy. Initially the guests toured the laboratory that enhances navigation expertise, and learned about the Academy's newest simulators for the Radar ARPA, ECDIS/ WECDIS. Later on, the Generals had an opportunity to witness training on a rocket and artillery team simulator trainers. After that they headed to see the underwater weapons simulation and then on to observe a marine communications and radar training facility.

The campus visit finished with a tour of the Navy ship bridge simulator and small arms training facility, where a demonstration was held on the use of various types of weapons.

After such a long, valuable and interesting day, the JFTC Command Group made their way back to Bydgoszcz. The trip has initiated the beginning of good cooperation between the JFTC and Polish Navy. ■

Modelling and Simulation (M&S) within Joint Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE)

LTC Petr Neuer,
JCBRN Defence COE Modelling and Simulation Cell Chief

Modelling and simulation technologies play an important role in many branches of industry, science and education. Potential for M&S employment is great and reaches all areas of military operations. A properly utilized M&S environment enables support to training, analysis, and may indicate required doctrinal changes.

The major task of M&S is to support effective training throughout the entire spectrum of soldiers' preparation (ranging from training of individual soldiers to the entire combined joint task force) and preparation of military staffs using integrated modelling and simulation supported exercises. This support contains live, virtual and constructive training applying modelling and simulation approach.

The next area of M&S involvement is analytical support of training requirements, operational and technical analyses. Furthermore, M&S offers methodologies to support refinement and changes to doctrine.

The JCBRN Defence COE, located in Vyskov, Czech Republic, supports Sponsoring Nations (SNs), NATO, PfP, governmental and non-governmental organizations in their efforts concerning CBRN related issues.

The M&S Section is an integral part of JCBRN Defence COE, so tasks for the M&S Cell are primarily aimed to CBRN domain. Predominant missions are connected with constructive CBRN simulation at the operational and strategic levels, and analysis before and after use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), releases of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM), as well as nuclear and radiological accidents. M&S prediction and assessment tools are used for analysis to support the military decision making processes. A robust environment for CBRN consequence and emergency management and interoperability is also provided.

Another task is to integrate CBRN M&S technologies in order to process the Main Events List (MEL) and Main Incidents List (MIL) creation. Enhanced assistance during preparation of exercises includes providing geographical information and multispectral simulation environment databases for simulation software as required.

One opportunity to demonstrate the JCBRN Defence COE M&S capabilities of constructive CBRN simulation at the operational and strategic level was preparation and execution of the Table Top Exercise (TTX) with M&S Enhancement for the 6th International Military Staff (IMS) CBRN Coordination Meeting, which was held 8-10 March 2011 in Vyskov.

The aim of the TTX was to evaluate the specific strategic, operational, policy and concept development, civil-military and partner's engagement, and assessment of NATO CBRN capability to plan and conduct an operation to mitigate a CBRN event. The task for the JCBRN Defence COE M&S section was to prepare possible scenarios for study at the operational level, to present modelling and simulation capabilities in support of crisis response planning. M&S tools provided graphical and analytical support (prediction of contaminated areas and casualties) for study process (threat evaluation, operational objectives, capability and capacities requirements, etc).

The M&S section conducted evolutionary phase during the preparation phase involving analysis and study process. Afterwards, three scenarios concerning possible CBRN incidents were evaluated and prepared for IMS discussion focusing on pre and post attack actions. The first scenario is described in this article.

SCENARIO:
Preventing the Proliferation and Protection against WMD/CBRN Threat Tasks. "Prague Radiological Device".

Alliance's response to a possible terrorist's acquisition of radiological/ nuclear material of sufficient quantity to produce a radiological device or another radiological/ nuclear weapon that has been stolen in a non-NATO country. It would begin with an increasing amount of indications and warnings that respective groups suggest a major attack against NATO nations using a High Visibility Event (HVE) as a primary target.

Study team produced three Courses of Action (COA) based on the mission and assumptions. Essential question was: **Which COA produced the worst case scenario?**

Our task was to simulate impact of Improvised Radiological Device. Allied intelligence agencies reported **significant**

evidence that **non-state actors** obtained radiological material stolen from nuclear store in X-country and have **intent to use** it against the Czech Republic.

COA 1

Radiological attack by **6kg of uranium-235** highly enriched (Beta emitter), close to the Petřín Outlook Tower in Prague, the Czech Republic

COA 2

One radiological attack by **6kg of plutonium-239** (Alpha emitter), close to the Petřín Outlook Tower in Prague, the Czech Republic.

COA 3

Two radiological attacks **2 x 3kg of plutonium-239** (Alpha emitter), first attack close to the Petřín Outlook Tower in Prague, another one in the Old-Town Square, Prague, The Czech Republic.

Date: 01 September 2011 (the same for all COA)
Time: 10:00 AM (the same for all COA)
Weather conditions:
Wind direction: 270 ° (same for all COA)
Wind speed: 4 mps (same for all COA)

Used SW tool: Hazard Prediction Assessment Capability (HPAC ver. 5)

Attack locations

Summary:

COA 1. 6kg of Uranium-235

- Very low deposition of Beta emitter
- Long zone of deposition (~ 30km)
  - out of Praha district
  - out of the Vltava catchment area
- 30 day doses in centre: 0.1 mSv



Result of Course of Action I

COA 2. 6kg of Plutonium-239
– Strong deposition of Alpha emitter
– Very short zone of deposition (~ 3 km)
– 30 day doses in centre: 0.1 mSv



Result of Course of Action II

COA 3. 2 x 3kg of Plutonium-239
– Strong deposition of Alpha emitter
– Zone of deposition (~ 6 km)
– 30 day dose in centre: 0.01 mSv



Result of Course of Action III

Proposed Scenario

Based on the three COAs the JCBRN Defence COE subject matter experts proposed to use Course of Action No. 3 – **two attacks of 3kg of Pu-239**.

After receiving Allied reports /with significant evidence/

– Non-state actors obtained amount of 6 kg – radioactive material /239Pu /;
– Non-state actors intend to use the radioactive material against the Czech Republic.

A radiological attack occurred on 011000B SEP 2011

– Caused by unknown non-state actor;
– Two radiological devices (**2 x 3kg of Pu-239**)
– 1. Close to Petrin Outlook Tower, Prague, Czech Republic
– 2. Old-Town Square, Prague, Czech Republic

Conclusion

A scenario with three potential COAs demonstrated the utility of the JCBRN Defence COE M&S capability in the analytical part of TTX. On the basis of the chosen scenario, the study case dealt with questions involving the decision making process (coordination and synchronization of a response option), concepts, legal aspects and limits of NATO support such a HVE (from CBRN perspective). Other areas of interest were stressed (a sufficient NATO INTEL and CBRN Reach Back, processes of sharing information among NATO INTEL and national INTEL, civil military synchronization/ coordination, sufficient capabilities to fulfill such a specific task, limitations of such a type of missions). The JCBRN Defence COE M&S capability (SW tools together with subject matter experts) provided solid and robust support for operational and strategic decision making processes. ■

JFTC SU Commander's Cup Shooting Competition

CAPT Katarzyna Fiedur,
JFTC Support Unit RLS Section Head

One of the attractions of the Polish Armed Forces Logistics Day was a shooting competition officially called the JFTC SU Commander's Cup Shooting Competition, organized at the garrison shooting range.

In the early morning of 7 March 2012 soldiers from international units located in Bydgoszcz competed in two shooting contests: using AK-47 rifle and WIST-94 pistol.

Before the competition started, all of them were instructed on safety measures and offered to shoot a training round from both weapons. In between the contests the competitors had a cup of hot tea to warm up a little.

The results came as a great surprise – after a matched rivalry Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Pawlak, US Air Force, proved to be the best in both competitions but he had to share the first prize in the AK-47 rifle contest with Commander Jarosław Kutka, Polish Navy. ■


LINIA
OTWARCIA
OGNIA

Polish Armed Forces Logistics Day at the JFTC

CAPT Katarzyna Fiedur,
JFTC Support Unit RLS Section Head

On 7 March 2012, the Joint Force Training Centre Support Unit (JFTC SU), the unit providing the Host Nation Support for the JFTC, invited the whole Bydgoszcz NATO family for the Polish Armed Forces Logistics Day. Soldiers from many different countries who currently serve in Bydgoszcz had an unusual opportunity to learn more about Polish logistic equipment and facilities which were displayed at the JFTC compound.

The Polish Armed Forces Logistics Day was opened by the JFTC Deputy Commander, Brigadier General Grzegorz Buszka. After welcoming the distinguished guests of the event, including Major General Marek Tomaszycki, the Chief of Training in the Polish Land Forces Command, he encouraged everybody to participate in the event and to learn more about the displayed military equipment.

All participants of the event could have a sightseeing tour of the Command Post's Mobile Module which provides command and staff workplaces in field conditions. Its computer systems enable cooperation with command and operations support automated systems. The modules may be


HMS JASMINE
Headquarters
Management System
JASMINE
TELOK

configured in such a way, that they can serve as command posts at different tactical levels.

It was also possible to see a very interesting live presentation of the operation of the 'Jasmine' management system. The 'Jasmine' system is a Network Centric Data Communication Teleinformatic Platform which:

- supports command and management processes and military operations at all levels down to dismounted soldier;
- creates situational awareness of troops, including headquarters and staffs, e.g. by creating the Common Operational Picture;
- increases security of troops and their elements including soldiers and vehicles;
- enables construction of military mobile networks in the IP technology.

The participants of the Logistics Day could also see the equipment used by Polish Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Unit, including air-cushioned minefield shoes (Mfc Checkmate safety shoes), mine detectors and mining and reconnaissance sets.

Another interesting display was the life-saving equipment used in a Field Hospital Module presented during the show. They could also train their basic life support skills by using a phantom for heart and lungs resuscitation.

As temperatures in March in Poland are rather low, the organizers provided everybody with a bowl of warm Polish traditional military pea soup. What is more, the NATO family in Bydgoszcz had a unique opportunity to observe the whole process of baking military bread in a Field Bakery and then they were presented a fresh loaf of bread. ■

The Bastille Day at the JFTC

MAJ Nicolas Konieczny,
Staff Officer at the JFTC Training Division

July 1789. People from Paris and French provinces suffered from the lack of basic resources and felt more and more frustrated towards the Old Regime (monarchy and nobles). On 14 July 1789, a part of the population of Paris rose up, attacked and seized the Bastille prison to demonstrate their anger against injustice and starvation. When King Louis XVI was informed about this seizure, he asked: "Is it a revolt?". One of his close counsellors wisely answered: "No Sir , it is a revolution!". It was the starting point of the French revolution which spread over France and the world the values of Liberty, Equality and Brotherhood. Therefore, as a symbol, 14 July became a French National Day and is called "Bastille Day".

To celebrate this national holiday, on Friday, 13 July, the French community under the command of its Senior National Representative, Colonel Francis Marec, for the second time organized the Bastille Day at the JFTC. The aim of this event was to gather the JFTC community and guests from the city of Bydgoszcz in a warm and 'esprit de corps' atmosphere.

The event was divided into 2 parts: a formal ceremony in the morning and a social event in the evening – barbecue and dancing. The ceremony in the morning involved all the JFTC members (military and civilian) and was chaired by Major General Pavel Macko, the JFTC Commander. After the introduction of troops by Brigadier General Jaromir Zuna, the JFTC Chief of Staff and Commander of the Troops, General Macko inspected the troops and delivered a speech emphasizing the weight of the values disseminated by the French Revolution and their connection with NATO's current involvements. Then, Colonel Francis Marec took the command for the French Flag Raising followed by the national anthem. Music for the whole ceremony was provided by the Military Band from Toruń.

In the evening, the JFTC members and guests enjoyed delicious barbecue prepared near the Flag Square, under tents decorated with French colors. To follow on with the 'French touch', dancing to the accompaniment of French songs started which let everybody have a good and convivial time before the period of holidays.

Thanks to the involvement of the participants and the team in charge of the organization, this event turned out to be a great success and again the spirit of the third pillar of the French Revolution motto - "Brotherhood" - was widely present. ■

JFTC Staff Ride to Międzyrzecz Fortified Region

LTC Piotr Kwas
Military Assistant to the JFTC Deputy Commander

Staff Ride to Międzyrzecz Fortification Region was the second event of this kind organized by the JFTC. The first was the last year's trip to Austerlitz which turned out to be a huge success. This year, with the aim to continue good tradition and contribute to professional development of staff members, we planned to go further into the World War II history. In order to provide the JFTC personnel with theoretical grounds on staff ride agenda, the day before the journey, LTC PhD Juliusz Tym from Polish Armed Forces Defense Academy prepared lectures and in this way, all staff members had an opportunity to learn some background information. Due to the fact that we were very busy work-wise at the JFTC many of those who wanted to take part in the trip could not make it. LTC PhD Juliusz Tym applied a top-down approach, covering the Soviet Operation in 1945 against Nazi Germany as well as the role of the Miedzyrzecz Fortified Region. It was a remarkably well-prepared military briefing. To some extent, for the former non - Warsaw Pact members, presented knowledge was an interesting eye-opener.

Before getting down to the staff ride

itself, let me mention the historical background of the Międzyrzecz Fortified Region. Fortifications are located in the Lubuskie Province in the vicinity of the town called Międzyrzecz, between the Warta and the Odra rivers, which were built in 1930s by Germany with the aim to repel any unexpected attack by Polish Armed Forces. The network of underground tunnels covers the area of roughly 100 square kilometers. In some spots it is up to 52 meters deep and in total it is about 32 km long. It was constructed in secret with the use of mining technology. Due to Adolf Hitler's decision, full system of fortifications was not finished as he considered it useless in a new warring environment. He noticed a novelty in the art of war from static-oriented WW I approach to kinetic-oriented development of mechanized and armored units. During WW II the Międzyrzecz Fortified Region was a poorly manned and equipped defense line. When in 1945 Soviet Army was approaching German capital, the fortifications were hastily manned with young inexperienced soldiers and provided with insufficient weapons. Soviet Army did not have much trouble to cross and capture the positions. Afterwards, they destroyed huge part of the fortifications but luckily for the postwar contemporaries not all.



The next day, after lectures we set off by bus to our first stopover at the historical site. The guided tour started with viewing of a well-camouflaged huge bunker, with the armor shield that weighs around 64 tones with a protected entrance hatch. On top were heavy turrets designed to cover sub-machine fire of the whole assigned defense area. The fire-power of the fortification was supported by stationary flame-throwers and semi-automatic mortars. Afterwards, we entered the bunker where we could see different functional rooms ranging from ammunition depots to sleeping quarters. In passing, unlike the French Maginot Line each soldier had his own bed and was allowed to decorate his room to make it a more comfortable place to take rest. Then, we went deep downstairs through a massive staircase. Then, we were almost 30 meters underground. To our amazement, we noticed huge corridors with massive ammunition warehouses. Additionally, on the ground there are a narrow-gauge rails to facilitate transportation in the tunnels. Unfortunately, the train system is out of service, therefore we were supposed to take a 3-hour walk to see other parts of the fortification. It was a very exciting march. Every now and then, small bats entertained us with their presence. Finally, we left the underground through another pitch-dark staircase without elevator. The tour was out-

standing; the medium-timed option chosen by us served its purpose. On the other hand, in my humble opinion, a full-time 12-hour tour would be too much.

The next day, we travelled to Żagań to stop at a German POW camp from WW II, where the most daring escapes were organized. In total, over 300 thousand military detainees from 30 nationalities were held there. Almost 120 thousand died of hunger and appalling living conditions. An old adage says: "It is a duty of every POW to try to run away". From Stalag Luft-III the most daring escape was prepared and executed. 76 prisoners, out of whom only 3 were not rearrested, ran away through a hand-dug underground tunnel. On personal order of Adolf Hilter 50 escapees were murdered at the place of capture. This moving event was the background story of an American movie made in 1963 entitled "The Great Escape" starring Steve McQeen. At the end of our visit to the POW camp, we commemorated the killed brave soldiers at a martyrs' monument.

The last point of our trip was a short visit to a Live Pottery Museum in Bolesławiec.

Finally, after a 6-hour drive we reached Bydgoszcz. To sum up, everybody was very tired but satisfied. We saw so much in such a short time. All in all, the staff ride appeared to be an indispensable factor to the professional development of staff members and definitely worth continuing in the future.

At the end, I would like to use this opportunity to extend our sincere gratitude to Polish Armed Forces Defense Academy for the support given which made the event remarkably unforgettable and fruitful. ■


ŻAGANIA
2002
2002

PUBLICATION GUIDELINES

1. The articles should be submitted in English;
2. The articles should be 1000-5000 words long;
3. The articles should be delivered as electronic files on a CD/DVD to the following address:
Joint Force Training Centre
ul. Szubińska 2
85-915 Bydgoszcz
Poland
or sent via an e-mail to the following address:
pao@jftc.nato.int;
4. The articles should be written in Microsoft Word format, single-spaced, Times New Roman font, 12 size, A4 paper size;
5. Photos sent as an illustration for the articles should be sent in JPEG files, minimum 500KB;
6. The author of the article should provide the editor with a short information about his profession, academic title, professional affiliation and contact details.

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